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Abstract 
We set up two experiments to measure how voters trade off the competence and honesty of 
candidates in elections. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them 
to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their 
work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one 
randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their 
earnings based on the first stage’s competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We 
find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results 
in lower payoffs. 
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1. Introduction 
We present an experimental study on the preferences of voters over candidates in public 
elections. We are interested in two key characteristics that define the quality of a candidate: 
competence and honesty. Competence refers to the ability of a potential public official to 
properly perform his/her job, identifying and employing the appropriate policies that enable 
her to get the job done. Honesty refers to the general attitude of the potential public official to 
fulfil the trust that the voters have placed on him or her; it usually implies a general aversion 
towards dishonest practices such as bribery, kickbacks, and public embezzlement which would 
benefit the public official to the detriment of the public; it can be understood within a fiduciary 
model of duty in politics according to which the public official behaves honestly in order to 
fulfil the trust of those who voted for him or her (Besley, 2005).1 
One can find many real-world examples which could be used to support either the 
primacy of honesty or that of competence for voting behavior. One example is the success of 
the anti-establishment movement of the comedian Beppe Grillo at the general and local 
elections in Italy over the last years. Many voters might have voted for Grillo’s party because 
of its choice to propose ordinary voters as candidates, with no experience on politics and public 
offices, but, as Grillo emphasized during his 2013 political campaign, much more honest than 
conventional politicians (Bartlett, 2013). Another comedian with limited political experience, 
Jimmy Morales, won the 2015 presidential elections in Guatemala under the slogan “neither 
corrupt nor a thief”. A pure dislike of voters for dishonest candidates (rather than a simple 
evaluation of the monetary costs and benefits associated to the selection of a dishonest public 
official) may also explain why, in certain cases, candidates affected by corruption scandals fail 
to be elected or experience a significant drop in voters’ support. For instance, in the elections 
of the US House of Representatives Peters and Welch (1980) and Welch and Hibbing (1997) 
found that incumbent candidates touched by corruption allegations lost more often their seats 
and received about 10% less than incumbent candidates with no corruption accusations. The 
results of the 2016 presidential elections in US are consistent with the claim that perceived 
                                                             
1 There are indubitably other aspects that may affect the quality of a public official, although, as Besley (2005, p. 
47) pointed out, “their merits are more difficult to assess”. Some of the possible extensions will be noted in Section 
10. In a previous study by Caselli and Morelli (2004), the authors used the same two characteristics to define the 
quality of a public official. Besley (2005) also used the term honesty to identify, along with competence, the 
principal dimensions of the quality of politician, and he interpreted it as “a duty of rulers to uphold the public 
trust” (Besley, 2005: pp. 48-49). From a more general perspective, competence and honesty can also be associated 
to the two universal dimensions of human social cognition: competence or efficiency, on the one side, and 
perceived warmth or trustworthiness, on the other side (in social psychology, see, e.g., Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske et 
al., 2002; in economics, see Butler and Miller, 2014). 
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honesty is important for voters. Donald Trump won the electoral college against most 
predictions. Looking at the voters’ pre-election evaluations of the candidates on key 
characteristics, we discover that most voters generally perceived Trump as more honest and 
trustworthy but less competent than Clinton. The difference in perceived honesty between the 
two candidates was particularly remarkable in those states considered, before the elections, 
most likely to be contested and which Trump managed to flip to the Republican side.2 We 
should stress that, even if Clinton lost the overall elections, she won the nationwide popular 
vote. This suggests that, if indeed people cared more about honesty than competence, their 
preference was however not lexicographic. 
Other real world examples can be found however in support of the opposite conjecture 
that voters are motivated by their final expected payoffs or care more about the competence of 
candidates rather than the honesty. For instance, many of the parliamentarians who were 
involved in the 2009 UK parliamentary expenses scandal held their seats in the 2010 general 
elections and experienced only a marginal drop in voters’ support (about 1.5% on average; 
Eggers and Fischer, 2011). In Brazil, the former Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva 
won the 2006 general elections regardless of the corruption scandals that plagued his previous 
administration and after a mandate characterized by steady economic growth and decrease in 
poverty for Brazil (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013).  
While all these examples are suggestive, they do not tell much about the real underlying 
preferences of voters over honesty and competence. Many other factors may have played a role 
in those voting decisions. In addition, it is not possible to discern how much of the voters’ 
behavior was indeed motivated by intrinsic rather than simple cost-benefit considerations. 
Research is thus needed to uncover the voters’ preferences over honesty and competence, and 
isolate them from other influences.  
The question that we ask in this paper is whether people have an intrinsic preference 
over one of these two characteristics that define the quality of a public official. From a 
traditional economic point of view, this should not be the case. A rational and purely self-
                                                             
2 In particular, Trump was seen as less qualified, with a worse temperament to serve as president, less able to 
understand people’s needs and problems, and less able to unite the country than Clinton. See, e.g., the polls from 
Economist/YouGov (2016, November 4–6), Fox News (2016, November 3–6); ABC News/Washington post 
(2016, November 7); CBS News/NY Times (2016, October 28 – November 1); McClatchy/Marist (2016, 
November 1–3); CNN (2016, October 20–23). We looked at the most recent polls released in the battleground 
states where the information about perceived honesty/trustworthiness was available. To identify the battleground 
states, we used the list provided by Politico at http://www.politico.com/2016-election/swing-states (accessed 15 
November 2016). 
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interested voter should always prefer the candidate that ensures the highest expected return for 
the elector irrespectively of whether this is because the selected candidate is more honest or 
more competent. The underlying idea – well captured by Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential 
campaign strategist James Carville in his slogan “[it’s] the economy, stupid” – is that people 
care only about their own financial position and want candidates who are able to improve it, 
irrespectively of everything else. The results of this study will tell us whether this is true or not 
based on the preferences of the voters over the characteristics of the candidates. They will also 
inform us whether people’s voting preferences can be responsible of why democracies may at 
times suffer from endemic dishonesty at the public level. Indeed, if voters display a rational 
and profit-maximizing voting behavior or a preference for competence over honesty, they may 
directly select dishonest officials into public office. On the contrary, if voters have an intrinsic 
preference for honest candidates, the existence of dishonesty at the public level can be better 
explained by other things such as country-level institutional and economic factors or a lack of 
information about the candidates. 
Why may people have an intrinsic preference for honest candidates? Voters may be 
reluctant to support a dishonest candidate if, for instance, they display what has been referred 
as “betrayal aversion”, that is a general dislike to “being betrayed beyond the mere payoff 
consequences” (Bohnet et al., 2008, p. 295), or if they care more about the process by which 
the payoffs are generated rather than the final payoffs (see, e.g., Rabin, 1993). Similarly, voters 
may be sensitive to a social norm that prescribes to punish a candidate who proves to be 
dishonest.  As a result, voters may select a candidate who is more reliable but overall less 
worthwhile than the contender in terms of what they can get in return in terms of monetary 
payoffs. 
The opposite, also plausible, possibility is that voters may support the more competent 
candidate, quite independently of the honesty of the alternative candidates and the expected 
returns associated to each of them. This may be the case if, for instance, voters think that the 
misuse of public power for personal benefit at the public level is a fact of life and, hence, 
justified (Peters and Welch, 1980) or if there is so much distrust in the public system that voters 
believe that the election of an honest public official would have no impact whatsoever on the 
system or only a marginal one.  
There are other possible explanations of why voters choose a certain candidate which 
abstract from the pure intrinsic preferences of the voters over honesty and competence. Most 
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notably, voters can be affected by the quality and level of information on the candidates 
available to them at the moment of the vote (Peters and Welch, 1980). Other important aspects 
that may influence the electoral choices of the voters are, for example, the electors’ partisanship 
to a certain ideology/party or the sensitivity of certain electors to some attractive characteristics 
of a candidate such as beauty or charisma. In this study, we do not investigate the impact of 
these other factors that may affect the decision making of the voters in elections, but we focus 
solely on the voters’ preferences over honesty and competence, in a context where the 
candidates differ only over these two characteristics and where the voters receive information 
about them (Woon, 2016, looks at the relationship between politician statements and perceived 
honesty in natural world environments). 
How can we study the voters’ preferences over honesty and competence in a 
comprehensive and revealing manner? One could rely on real-world data. The problem is that, 
in modern democratic elections, the vote is secret and anonymous. Hence, data on voters’ 
preferences can be only collected either in aggregate form after an election or via public opinion 
polls and surveys. Aggregate data are usually difficult to interpret due to the lack of control 
over many unobservable variables, in primis the individual characteristics of the voters. The 
answers of voters to surveys and public opinion polls can be instead highly affected by social 
pressure, especially because voters are asked about sensitive topics such as political preferences, 
and, therefore, not fully reliable (DeMaio, 1984). 
By means of a lab experiment, we are able to bypass all these limitations and collect 
data on individual voting behavior which is usually difficult to analyze with standard empirical 
approaches. In our experimental setting, participants are matched in groups of three subjects. 
One participant (the public official) individually performs a real-effort task to produce a 
common fund. This participant is then asked to report the privately known value of the common 
fund to other two subjects. Only what he or she reports is split equally between the three 
subjects (he or she keeps what he or she does not report).3 In a first stage, the public official is 
selected at random by the computer. In a second stage, each participant is re-matched with 
other two new subjects and asked to select who will be the public official between the two 
based on their first stage’s competence (performance in the real-effort task) and honesty (report 
of the common fund). By looking at cases where there is a competence-honesty trade-off in the 
                                                             
3 To clarify, and as detailed later, all three players do the real-effort task and the honesty task in the eventuality 
that they are selected as the public official, in which case their decisions may count towards final earnings. 
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voting problem, we can then measure the extent to which competence and honesty matter in 
electoral decisions, and test whether, in the end, only the expected financial bottom line matters 
for voters. We find that most subjects tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty 
irrespectively of whether this maximizes their earnings or not. 
Insofar as we are aware of, ours is the first study (experimental or otherwise) that looks 
at the trade-off between two dimensions voters are likely to care about, honesty and 
competence of others, and which isolates the extent to which voters sacrifice payoff either in 
the direction of getting more competence or in the direction of getting more honesty. As 
discussed towards the end of the paper, our new experimental paradigm can be a starting point 
for verifying the impact of a number of other dimensions voters may care about. 
Ours is a stylized first experiment of course. We tightly define competence in terms of 
impact of an effort on overall productivity, and this is what is being measured and is 
comparatively straightforward to interpret in our real effort task, in a way that it would not be 
in more complex if empirically more plausible tasks.  
A laboratory setting offers important advantages to study the extent to which voters 
care about the honesty and competence of candidates in public elections. It allows us to control 
and directly observe the level of competence and honesty of the different candidates, while 
removing all the other possible factors that may influence the decisions of the voters. Of course, 
this comes at a cost which is related to the general critique that laboratory findings might fail 
to generalize to real world settings. This issue is shared with many other studies examining 
voter behavior in the lab (e.g. Grosser and Schram, 2006; Battaglini et al., 2010; Woon, 2012; 
Kanthak and Woon, 2015), and more in general, any other lab experiments (for a recent 
discussion of this, see Frechette and Schotter, 2015). One could, of course, argue that the 
problem of generalizability applies to any data set (experimental and not), given that any 
empirical observation is time and space dependent (Falk and Huffman, 2007). In addition, 
studies which look at lab-field comparisons usually find a good generalizability of the lab 
results to the field (see Camerer, 2015). That said, we provide, at the end of the paper, some 
venues for future research to increase generalizability involving more complex experimental 
settings and more heterogeneous populations. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
related to this study. Section 3 presents the experimental design of a first experiment. Section 
4 describes the theoretical background. Section 5 contains the first experiment’s results. 
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Section 6 presents the design of a second experiment, and Section 7 the results. Section 8 uses 
the combined data from the two experiments to analyze voting behavior at individual level. 
Sections 9 and 10 discuss the findings and conclude, respectively.  
2. Related literature 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that measures the extent to which voters 
trade off competence for honesty in electoral decisions. That said, one strand of related 
literature is about electoral delegation. In our experiment, a subject is chosen by some voters 
to be the public official and act for them. Several studies investigate the behavioral implications 
of delegating a decision about outcomes to another person (e.g. Markussen and Tyran, 2017; 
Otto and Bolle, 2016; Corazzini et al., 2012; Hamman et al., 2011; Bolle and Vogel, 2010; 
Samuelson and Messick, 1986; Samuelson et al., 1984; Messick et al., 1983). Differently from 
our study, this literature focuses primarily on the delegate’s behavior and its implications in 
terms of welfare rather than the preferences of the people over the characteristics of the 
potential delegates.4 What these studies usually find is that delegation leads to more efficient 
and equitable outcomes, especially when it is democratic. Similarly, voting preferences on the 
characteristics of the potential leaders is not a topic covered in the economic research on 
leadership, whereas it is the focus of our paper. Indeed, a public official can be seen in many 
respects as a leader. The literature on leadership mostly focuses on the impact of leading by 
example and typically shows that the presence of a leader increases cooperation (e.g. Gäcther 
et al., 2012; Güth et al., 2007; Potters et al., 2007; Moxnes and van der Hejden, 2003). Some 
papers compare the implications of having randomly selected leaders with elected leaders (e.g. 
Levy et al., 2011; Kocher et al., 2013; Brandts et al., 2015), leaders appointed based on their 
past contribution (e.g. Gäcther and Renner, 2005), leaders appointed based on participant’s 
performance in a pre-task (e.g. Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010), and self-selected leaders (e.g. 
Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Arbak and Villeval, 2011). These studies suggest that the impact of the 
mechanism to select a leader on the followers’ behavior is often not neutral. In our experiment, 
the ‘leader’ is endogenously selected, as in some of this research. However, in contrast to this 
literature, our study is not about leadership by example, and we are not interested in the leader 
                                                             
4 One exception is Markussen and Tyran (2017) who also study whether voters are able to select public-spirited 
leaders in a public good game based on some noisy signal about past behavior provided strategically by the 
candidates, and the information about candidates’ cognitive ability. They find that voters tend to use the 
information about past contributions to select the leader but disregard the information about cognitive ability. 
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and followers’ behavior but on subjects’ preferences over the characteristics of the potential 
leaders. 
Another stream of literature related to our study is about honesty in decision making. 
In our experiment, voters are asked to elect a public official who could breach the fiduciary 
relationship that he or she holds with his or her constituency, and behave dishonestly by 
underreporting the value of a common fund for personal benefits. Economists have empirically 
investigated dishonesty mostly using experimental data. Some have studied lying and 
dishonesty in cheap talk games where some players can send true or false message regarding 
some kind of private information (e.g. future moves) to other players (e.g. Sutter, 2009; Gneezy, 
2005; Croson, 2005). In these studies, deception is totally disclosed to the experimenter. Other 
scholars – not only in economics – have studied unobserved lying behavior and lying aversion 
by tracing its distribution from subjects’ reported results of a dice roll, coin flip or matrix task 
(e.g. Dai et al., 2017; Abeler et al., 2014; Fischbacher and Heusi, 2013; Houser et al., 2012; 
Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Mazar and Ariely, 2006). This literature on cheating and lying 
behavior has shown that people care about being honest, and this preference is sensitive to 
many environmental variables. We contribute to this literature by showing that people do not 
only care about their own honesty, but also about the honesty of others in the context of political 
elections. Within the experimental literature on cheating and lying behavior, one study which 
explores lying behavior in the context of political elections is Woon and Kanthak (2016). 
Differently from us, they focus on whether candidates send truthfully campaign messages 
regarding their performance in a problem-solving task depending on the electoral incentives. 
They find that lying behavior is sensitive to the private incentives of the candidates to win the 
election and it is prevalent even when the incentives of voters and candidates are aligned. 
Our study is also related to some research on corruption. Barr at al. (2009) and Azfar 
and Nelson (2007) used a Public Servant’s Game to study corruption in service delivery. In 
this game, one subject is assigned the role of service provider (or executive), a second subject 
the role of monitor (or attorney general), and the remaining subjects (6 subjects) are community 
members. The decision of the service provider, that is how many tiles (from a random 
distribution) to allocate to the community, is similar to the one of the public official in our 
experiment. However, differently from us, none of these studies explore the trade-off between 
the competence and honesty of the potential service providers or executives but they only focus 
on how some institutional factors influence corruption. In particular, they find that increasing 
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the capacity to identify corruption, increasing the official’s wage, and allowing the election of 
the law enforcement officer reduce corrupt behavior. 
A few economists and political scientists have also examined the extent to which voters 
may support corrupted incumbents in public elections, suggesting that voters may have a 
tendency to punish corrupt politicians (e.g. Peters and Welch, 1980; Welch and Hibbing, 1997; 
Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Bågenholm, 2013). These studies 
are to some extent linked to ours since corruption may be a sign of dishonesty, particularly if 
the interests of the voters are aligned with those of the public. However, these works primarily 
used aggregate-level empirical approaches and focus solely on the impact of corruption on 
incumbents’ re-election without investigating the trade-off between honesty and competence. 
An exception is the political study of Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013), who employed a non-
incentivized survey experiment to investigate the attitude of respondents towards hypothetical 
incumbent politicians (vignettes) described in the form of qualitative sentences. 
There is political science research studying the importance of the quality of the 
candidates, defined as a combination of integrity and competence, in electoral choices (Mondak 
and Huckfeldt, 2006; Mondak, 1995; Kulisheck and Mondak, 1996; McCurley and Mondak, 
1995). Mondak (1995) investigated the permanence of incumbents in the US House of 
Representatives in relation to the quality of the incumbents, measured as an index of 
competence and integrity constructed with content analysis. He found that high-quality US 
House members remained in office longer than low-quality members. McCurley and Mondak 
(1995) combined the aggregate-level data on the quality of US House of Representatives’ 
incumbents with individual-level post-election survey data to explore whether the skill and 
integrity of the candidates affect the voters’ evaluation of the candidates and their voting cho ice. 
They found that the quality scores do affect the evaluation of the candidates. Similar findings 
are provided by Kulisheck and Mondak (1996) who investigated whether the information 
concerning the quality of hypothetical candidates influences the voting choice of subjects in a 
survey experiment. Mondak and Huckfeldt (2006) collected data from a series of survey 
experiments and a national survey to study the accessibility of the competence and integrity of 
hypothetical candidates in the evaluation of the contenders, and how people respond to these 
characteristics relative to partisanship and ideology. They found that competence and integrity 
are slightly more accessible than partisanship and ideology, and are perceived favorably by 
subjects. Altogether these studies provide evidence that the quality of candidates matter in 
national elections. However, they are inconclusive on which dimension of the quality matters 
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the most. In addition, they present several features in relation to which our laboratory 
experiment approach based on an incentivized environment is able to provide a significant 
contribution. First, when aggregate-level empirical approaches are used (e.g. Mondak, 1995; 
McCurley and Mondak, 1995), it is usually difficult to isolate and control for the effects of 
important unobservable variables, such as, for instance, the information available upon the 
candidates. In addition, one can question the subjectivity and precision of the measure used to 
identify the quality of a candidate, and the reliability of post-election surveys to measure the 
voters’ support for a candidate (see, e.g., DeMaio, 1984; Lodge et al., 1990). Finally, when 
survey experiments are used (Kulisheck and Mondak, 1996; Mondak and Huckfeldt, 2006), 
the situations described to the subjects are hypothetical, there are no economic incentives 
associated with the choices, the focus is more on attitude and perception rather than behavior, 
and the quality of the candidates is identified only with qualitative statements and phrases. 
While these comments are not to deny the value of these studies, they suggest that an 
experimental approach of the kind we use would be especially useful to complement them. 
3. Experiment 1: experimental design 
3.1 Outline 
To investigate the preferences of voters over the competence and honesty of candidates 
in public elections, we conduct two experiments. In this section, we describe the experimental 
design of Experiment 1. This experiment was conducted in Lyon (France) at the Groupe 
d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), in December 2014. 90 subjects participated in 
6 experimental sessions (9 or 18 subjects per session). Subjects were randomly recruited with 
the online software h-root (Bock et al., 2014). Subjects were mostly students with different 
socio-demographic background (details are provided in the online appendix). No subject 
participated in more than one session. To ensure an absolute stranger matching between 
subjects, each session was conducted with a number of subjects equal to a multiple of 9. 
Variations in the number of participants across sessions (9 or 18) reflect differences in the show 
up rates across sessions. The experiment was fully computerized and programmed with the z-
Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions are available in the online appendix. 
Each session consisted of two stages and a final questionnaire. At the beginning of each 
stage, subjects were informed that there were two stages in the experiment, but the instructions 
for each stage were revealed to subjects only at the beginning of each stage. This was to help 
with the cognitive processing of the instructions as well as to minimize strategic behavior. We 
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simply made clear in the stage 1 instructions that the information provided by the subjects in 
each stage may be reported to other participants at a later stage of the experiment but anonymity 
will be preserved. Experiment 2 controls for the possible effect of this clarification (see Section 
7). Subjects received both computerized and printed instructions for the relevant stage. 
The instructions were context-free and written avoiding any suggestive terminology. 
Each set of instructions was followed by a control questionnaire whose purpose was to check 
subjects’ understanding of the instructions. During the experiment, payoffs were calculated in 
points and converted to euros at the end of the experiment (1 point = 20 euro cent). Each subject 
earned on average €21.71 (around 24.45 US dollars) including €5 of show-up fee. Subjects 
were paid in private and in cash in a separate room outside the lab by a research assistant who 
was not present during the experiment and who was not aware of its content. Each session 
lasted around 1 hour and 15 minutes. We ran 2 treatments, described below: the No Beliefs 
treatment (45 subjects), and the Beliefs treatment (45 subjects). Upon arrival to the lab, each 
subject was registered for the experiment and randomly assigned to a computer desk which 
was separated from the others by partitions. Afterwards, subjects received the instructions for 
the first stage.  
3.2 The No Beliefs treatment 
In both stages of the experiment, subjects played an Official’s Dilemma Game. At the 
beginning of each stage, each participant was matched with two different subjects to form a 
group of three members (the matching was absolute stranger). The computer assigned a 
common fund to each triad with an initial value of 0 points. Subjects were asked to work on a 
real effort task and make a decision at the end of it. The real effort task consisted in counting 
the number of 1s in a series of tables containing 0s and 1s for 10 minutes (see, e.g., Abeler et 
al., 2011; Pokorny, 2008). A table consisted of a 5 × 5 matrix of 0s and 1s. For each table, the 
computer randomly generated a number of 0s and 1s in a random order. In a given session, all 
the subjects faced the same series of randomly generated tables. We chose this particular real 
effort task because it provides enough variation in performance. The task is also simple and 
does not require any particular knowledge. At the same time, it is tedious and, therefore, 
mentally costly for the subjects. Finally, the experimenter does not benefit from the output of 
the task. These are all important features of our task since we wanted to minimize the 
reciprocity of subjects towards the experimenter, and to ensure that our measure of competence 
was minimally affected by other external influences (Abeler et al., 2011). 
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Only the performance of one of the three subjects counted for the earnings of each stage. 
This person was the public official (neutrally labeled appointed co-participant in the 
instructions). In particular, for each table that the public official solved on top of the first 40 
tables correctly solved, the value of the common fund increased by 4 points. The purpose of 
this multiplier was to make the total output bigger and to increase the monetary incentives. The 
rationale for the threshold of 40 tables will be explained later (see Section 5.1).  
At the end of the real effort task, the common fund accumulated a certain value. Only 
the public official knew this value. He or she was then asked to report it to the other members 
of the triad, knowing that he or she could report any number between a minimum value of 10% 
and the true value of the common fund. Asking subjects to report a private information (in our 
case, the outcome of a simple task) is a standard procedure used in the experimental literature 
to measure honesty/dishonesty (for a review, see Rosenbaum et al., 2013).5 We imposed a 
minimum value of 10% to be reported by the public official in order to avoid observations at 
zero. This is an important aspect for Stage 2 as people may avoid voting for a candidate simply 
because he or she displays a zero in one of the characteristics rather than a minimum positive 
value. The reported value of the common fund was then divided equally between the three 
participants. The public official kept the unreported value of common fund for himself or 
herself.  
Each subject was informed only at the end of the experiment whether he or she had 
been appointed as public official in either of the stages of the experiment. This means that, in 
each stage, every subject exerted a real effort and made a decision as if he or she were the 
public official. At the end of the experiment, only the effort and decision of the public official 
were used to determine the earnings of the subjects. This mechanism allowed us to collect a 
measure of honesty and competence for each participant in each stage. In particular, the 
                                                             
5 A purely self-interested agent should always misreport the value of the common fund. In our task, like in most 
of the experiments on cheating and lying behavior, honesty can be the result of different factors such as a direct 
distaste of lying, other-regarding preferences, reputational concerns and cognitive biases (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 
2017). In this paper, with the partial exception of other-regarding preferences which we consider below, we do 
not investigate the voters’ preferences for each of these potential components of honesty but we look at honesty 
as a whole. As such, a preference for honesty may, in our experiment, not necessarily or only reflect a pure direct 
distaste for dishonest behavior. Note also that we are interested in “selfish” dishonesty, which is beneficial to the 
liar but detrimental to another party. As Gneezy (2005) pointed out, this type of lies is the most relevant from an 
economic perspective. We acknowledge that there other types of lies which do not or not only benefit the liars 
(see Erat and Gneezy, 2012) and which can be likewise relevant in electoral decisions. For instance, a politician 
can behave dishonestly to favor a member or a group of his or her constituency. In the current paper, we assume 
that no one else benefits from the public official’s dishonesty. It would be interesting, in future studies, to relax 
this assumption and investigate the implications of having a third party who benefits if the public official behaves 
dishonestly.  
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proportion of the common fund reported to the other subjects was our measure of honesty. The 
number of tables correctly solved on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved was our measure 
of competence.  
How was the public official selected in the two stages of the experiment? In Stage 1, 
the public official was randomly chosen by the computer. In Stage 2, it was endogenously 
selected by the members of the group. In particular, at the beginning of Stage 2, each subject 
was informed of (a) the number of tables correctly solved by each other member of the triad in 
the earlier real effort task of Stage 1 (this provided a measure of competence for each candidate); 
and (b) the proportion of the common fund that, in Stage 1, each other member of the triad 
would report to the others in case he or she were to be assigned the role of appointed co-
participant (this provided a measure of honesty for each candidate). Based on this information, 
each subject was asked to vote: that is, to choose which of the two other participants he or she 
wanted to appoint as the public official. Then the computer implemented the voting decision 
of one randomly selected subject within each triad; this mechanism ensured that voting was 
incentive compatible, by removing any scope for strategic voting behavior. All of the rules for 
generating and distributing experimental earnings were common knowledge for all subjects at 
the point of selecting the public official: therefore, in selecting the public official, subjects 
knew that their earnings depended on the competence (in solving tables) and the honesty (in 
reporting the value of the common fund) of the public official.  
3.3 Conditional Information Lottery (CIL) 
To collect more data, in general and by individual, on the voting behavior of the subjects 
without deceiving them, we employed the so-called Conditional Information Lottery (Bardsley, 
2000). This technique consists in camouflaging one true task amongst other fictional tasks, 
with the subjects fully aware that there is a camouflage but uninformed ex-ante of which task 
is the true one (Bardsley, 2000). More specifically, in the selection of the public official, each 
subject was presented with ten randomly ordered situations: one real and nine fictional. In the 
real situation, each subject was informed about the actual competence and honesty of the other 
participants within his or her group. In the fictional situations, each subject was instead 
presented with fictitious information about the competence and honesty of the other two 
participants. In particular, to make the camouflage credible and realistic, the information used 
in the fictional situations came from subjects, chosen at random by the computer, who 
participated in either pilot or past sessions. More specifically, to generate the fictional situations, 
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the computer randomly combined subjects from pilot and past sessions using a stratification 
procedure which followed approximately the distribution of the cases observed until then. In 
two fictional situations, one candidate strictly or weakly dominated the other candidate in both 
characteristics (competence and honesty). All the other seven fictional situations corresponded 
to cases where the characteristics of the two candidates were orthogonal and differed in the 
extent to which the two candidates were different in terms of expected payoffs generated for 
the voter. Each subject faced, on average, two situations where the difference in expected 
payoffs between the two candidates laid in the interval [0, 5] experimental points; two other 
situations where the difference laid in the interval (5, 10] experimental points; another two 
situations where the difference lay in the interval (10, 20] experimental points; and another one 
where in the interval (20, 50] experimental points. This stratified randomization allowed us to 
provide to the subjects enough decoys to prevent them from spotting the true situation, and, at 
the same time, to collect more information on the electoral choices of subjects for different 
level of expected payoffs of the candidates. The order of the ten situations was randomized. 
For each situation, each subject was asked to choose which of the two participants he or she 
wanted to appoint as the public official, knowing that only the decision of one participant 
selected at random in the real situation was implemented. 
As Bardsley (2000) pointed out, the CIL procedure might induce “cold” decisions 
because of the hypothetical nature of the task. This might actually be desirable in our 
experiment for at least two reasons. First, we can provide a clear-cut measure of how much 
voters trade off competence for honesty in the absence of other confounding influences such 
as emotional drivers. Of course, one can argue that a real election often involves hot and 
emotional decisions. Consider, for instance, the impact that a demagogic political campaign 
may have on voters’ decisions. However, as we clarified earlier, we are not interested in the 
effects of other factors, beyond competence and honesty, that may affect the decision making 
of the voters in elections. Second, the CIL procedure should, if anything, induce more rational 
decisions. Our behavioral hypotheses are opposite to rational behavior, and, therefore, any 
result which challenges this assumption may be even stronger. The CIL procedure may also 
dilute the incentives of the experiment, and increase the misunderstanding of the experimental 
procedures. To minimize these drawbacks, we limited the fictional situations to only ten and 
made sure that subjects fully understood the instructions. It was also important that subjects 
did not spot the true situation. As we have already mentioned earlier, we adopted a procedure 
of stratified randomization to select the fictional situations from real situations occurred in pilot 
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and past sessions, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for the subjects to identify the true 
situation. Finally, in a pilot study of this paper reported in Galeotti and Zizzo (2014), we 
describe how, in an earlier experiment, we ran some sessions without the CIL procedure as a 
control to check whether any biases were produced from using the CIL procedure. We found 
no bias. 
3.4 The Beliefs treatment 
One potential limitation of the No Beliefs treatment is that we do not know what the 
subjects actually think of the honesty and competence of the candidates. In particular, if we 
observe a bias towards one of these characteristics, this bias could be due to the way that people 
engage in the inference problem (i.e. what subjects conclude about the honesty and competence 
of a candidate based on the information we provide to them) rather than a true preference 
towards one of these attributes. To tackle this issue, we ran the Beliefs treatment.  
The Beliefs treatment differs from the No Beliefs treatment only in the voting phase of 
Stage 2. In particular, for each voting situation, and before choosing one of the two candidates, 
subjects were also asked to indicate how many tables they think each candidate will correctly 
solve, and what proportion of the common fund they think each candidate will report. At the 
end of the experiment, the computer randomly drew, for each participant, one guess in the real 
situation. Subjects earned 2 extra euros if their guess was correct. If the guess was incorrect by 
𝑥  tables (in the case the randomly drawn guess was about the tables correctly solved) or 
percentage points (in the case the randomly drawn guess was about the proportion of the 
common fund reported), subjects earned max(0, 2 − 0.1𝑥) extra euros.6 All the other aspects 
of the experiment were identical to the No Beliefs treatment. 
 
3.5 Final questionnaire and payments 
In both the Beliefs and No Beliefs treatments, after Stage 2, subjects had to complete a 
4-parts questionnaire, reproduced in the online appendix. In part 1, we measured the risk 
attitude of subjects. We employed the Eckel et al. (2012)’s task in the domain of gains. In this 
task, subjects had to choose one gamble out of six possible gambles. Each gamble was 
                                                             
6 The absolute difference belief elicitation mechanism is a standard method used in experimental research (see 
Croson, 2000, for an early use). A sufficient condition for it to be at least weakly incentive compatible under both 
risk neutral and averse agents is that the belief distribution is symmetrical and at least weakly unimodal around 
the central moment. 
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represented with a circle and involved two payoffs with 50% probability of occurrence each. 
Moving from gamble 1 to gamble 6, both expected return and risk increased. This part was 
incentivized. Part 2 was the Stöber (2001)’s 17-item Social Desirability Scale (SDS17 score) 
which measures how much a person desires to be perceived in a positive light. Part 3 was the 
Christie and Geis (1970)’s 20-item Machiavellianism scale (MACH score) which measures a 
person’s tendency to be amoral and opportunist. In the last part of the questionnaire, we 
collected some demographics and elicited subjects’ belief about the objective of the experiment. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly drew one of the two stages. Subjects were 
paid the earnings of that stage plus the show-up fee of €5 and any additional earnings that they 
obtained by answering the final questionnaire. In the Beliefs treatment, they were also paid the 
earnings of one randomly drawn guess. 
4. Theoretical background 
In this section, we set the theoretical background for our analysis. Let n be a generic 
risk-neutral voter who must choose between two candidates (J = 2) in a public election. Each 
candidate possesses two attributes (competence and honesty). These two attributes reflect some 
optimal choices of the candidate (e.g. honesty, in our experiment, reflects the decision of how 
much to report of the common fund) which we take as given and do not analyze here.7 The 
earnings of the voter depend on the competence and honesty of the chosen candidate.  
Let us call 𝜋𝑛,𝑗  the expected earnings of the generic voter n if the candidate j is 
appointed.  This can be defined as: 
𝜋𝑛,𝑗 = 𝐴𝐻𝑛𝑗𝐶𝑛𝑗                                                           (1) 
where A is the constant multiplier of voter n’s profit function (equal to 4/3 in our 
experiment, where 3 is the group size, and 4 is the value of one table correctly solved by the 
candidate on top of the first 40 correct tables and reported to the voter); 𝐻𝑛𝑗 (𝐶𝑛𝑗) captures the 
mean expectation of voter n on the honesty (competence) of candidate j. For simplicity, we will 
                                                             
7 We are not interested in the process through which a candidate chooses her competence and honesty. In our 
theoretical analysis, the voter forms some correct or incorrect beliefs about the optimal levels of competence and 
honesty chosen by a candidate, and these are given in our model. As such, we do not make any assumptions about 
the optimal behavior of the candidates. In our experiment, if one were to assume that candidates are rational and 
payoff maximizing, then they are predicted to maximize the number of tables solved correctly and to report only 
the minimum value of the common fund. This assumption is however not supported by our data (see Sections 5 
and 7). In addition, when one looks at stated beliefs, only one voter in Experiment 1 (and another one in 
Experiment 2) expected the candidates to report the minimum value of the common fund.  
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just refer to honesty and competence of candidate j. In our experiment, (expected) honesty is 
measured as the proportion of the common fund that voter n expects candidate j to report to the 
voters in stage 2; (expected) competence is measured as the expected number of tables that 
voter n think candidate j will correctly solve (on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved) in 
the real effort task of stage 2. We assume that 𝐻𝑛𝑗 and 𝐶𝑛𝑗 are not correlated. We check this in 
our experiment and we find that the correlation is indeed close to zero (see Section 5.1 for 
details). 
At this stage, we do not make any assumption about how voter n forms her beliefs about 
the competence and honesty of candidate j. This is irrelevant for deriving the theoretical results 
below. In analyzing the data, we will consider different alternatives. In particular, we will 
assume that subjects rely on stage 1’s competence and honesty to derive stage 2’s behavior and 
make their decisions (i.e. adaptive expectations); we will also consider the case where subjects 
have, on average, correct expectations about the impact of stage 1’s competence and honesty 
on stage 2’s earnings (i.e. rational expectations). Finally, we will analyze the data based on the 
beliefs about stage 2’s honesty and competence that the voters reported in the Beliefs treatment. 
The profit function is a Cobb-Douglas with profit elasticities of competence and 
honesty equal to 1. Each elasticity measures the responsiveness of the profit to a change in 
competence or honesty, ceteris paribus. In particular, a 1% increase in competence would lead 
to a 1% increase in profit. Similarly, a 1% increase in honesty would lead to a 1% increase in 
profit. 
The voter obtains a certain utility if a certain candidate is elected. In particular, the 
utility that voter n gets if candidate j is appointed is 𝑈𝑛,𝑗, j = 1, 2. If the voter is rational and 
profit maximizing, she should choose the candidate that gives the highest utility, and her utility 
should be an increasing function of the expected earnings. For simplicity, let the utility be a 
standard Cobb-Douglas function which can be defined as follows:  
𝑈𝑛,𝑗 = 𝐴𝐻𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐻𝐶𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐶 𝑒𝜖𝑛,𝑗                                                  (2) 
where 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐶  are the weights (elasticities) of the honesty and the competence 
respectively of the candidate j in the utility function of voter n, and the parameter A is the same 
as the parameter A of the profit function. 𝐴𝐻𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐻𝐶𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐶 is the known component of the utility 
function, whereas 𝑒𝜖𝑛,𝑗  is the stochastic component (unknown component).  
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The Cobb-Douglas function has been widely used in economics to identify the 
production function of a firm or the utility function of an economic agent (see, e.g., Mas-Colell 
et al., 1995). In our context, it is particularly useful as it allows us to estimate the weights that 
a voter places on the honesty and competence of the candidates in a directly comparable way 
even if honesty and competence are measured in different units. In particular, the weights are 
expressed in terms of elasticities (and not units), that is how much the utility varies (in 
percentage) if honesty or competence increases by 1%. In addition, it is logically consistent 
with the essential elements of our experiment. In particular, it is directly linked to the profit 
function used in our experiment. More precisely, it can be reduced to a function of the profit if 
the weights of honesty and competence are identical. In the online appendix, we consider a 
different specification where the utility of the voters is a function of the expected profit of a 
candidate, plus two additive terms for honesty and competence. 
If the two attributes have the same weight in the utility (𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 = 𝛼), the voter cares 
only about his or her profit. We can rewrite the utility as a function of the profit: 
 𝑈𝑛,𝑗 = 𝜋𝑛,𝑗
𝛼𝑒𝜖𝑛,𝑗                                                         (3) 
Theoretical Result 1. If voters are rational and profit maximizing, 𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 = 𝛼, with 𝛼 > 0. 
If 𝛼  is equal to 0, the utility does not depend on the profit. If 𝛼  is less than 0, it 
negatively depends on the profit. If 𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐶  (𝛼𝐶 > 𝛼𝐻), it means that the voter weighs more 
the honesty (competence) of the candidate over the competence (honesty), and over what would 
be predicted by profit maximization. 
Theoretical Result 2. If honesty matters more than competence, 𝛼𝐻 will be greater than 𝛼𝐶 . 
Theoretical Result 3. If competence matters more than honesty, 𝛼𝐶  will be greater than 𝛼𝐻. 
Note that all these theoretical results hold irrespectively of what we assume about the 
beliefs of the voter regarding the competence and honesty of the candidate. These beliefs affect 
the values of 𝐻𝑛𝑗  (expected honesty) and 𝐶𝑛𝑗  (expected competence) that enter the utility 
function of the voter. However, our theoretical results regarding 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  remain the same. 
For instance, let us assume that the voter believes that the public official is rational and payoff 
maximizing, and therefore expects him to maximize the number of tables solved correctly and 
to report only the minimum (10% of the common fund). This means that 𝐻𝑛𝑗 will be equal to 
10% and 𝐶𝑛𝑗 to a given maximum value. If the voter only cares about the final earnings, the 
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elasticities of honesty and competence must still be the same (i.e. 𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 = 𝛼) in order to 
have a utility which is a direct function of the profit. 
To test empirically our three theoretical results, we can take the natural logarithm of 
the utility to obtain a linear function in parameters: 
ln(𝑈𝑛,𝑗) = 𝑉𝑛,𝑗 = ln(𝐴) + 𝛼𝐻ln (𝐻𝑛𝑗) + 𝛼𝐶ln (𝐶𝑛𝑗) + 𝜖𝑛,𝑗                 (4) 
The probability that voter n chooses candidate i over j is: 
𝑃𝑛,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛,𝑖 > 𝑉𝑛,𝑗) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛,𝑖 − 𝑉𝑛,𝑗 > 0)                         (5) 
We can derive the logit choice probability assuming that the error term (𝜖𝑛,𝑗) is iid with 
a Type-I extreme value distribution. The equation for the logit choice probability that voter n 
chooses candidate i from the choice set {𝑖, 𝑗} is: 
𝑃𝑛,𝑖|{𝑖,𝑗} = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛,𝑖 > 𝑉𝑛,𝑗) =
exp{𝛼𝐻[ln(𝐻𝑛𝑖)−ln(𝐻𝑛𝑗)]+𝛼𝐶[ln(𝐶𝑛𝑖)−ln(𝐶𝑛𝑗)]}
1+exp{𝛼𝐻[ln(𝐻𝑛𝑖)−ln(𝐻𝑛𝑗)]+𝛼𝐶[ln(𝐶𝑛𝑖)−ln(𝐶𝑛𝑗)]}
         (6) 
Note that, since our model is constructed from utility differences, the characteristics of 
the voters as well as any other variable which does not vary over the choices of the voters (e.g. 
the constant term ln (A)) are dropped out from the model. The estimation of 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐶  is 
relatively straightforward through maximum likelihood estimation as we observe the choices 
of the voters and we have measures of the honesty and competence of the candidates. 
5. Experiment 1: experimental results 
5.1 Descriptive and aggregate results 
Table 1 shows the average measures of competence and honesty from the two stages of 
the experiment. In the table, honesty is the proportion of the common fund that a subject would 
report if he or she were to be the public official; competence is the number of tables correctly 
solved on top of the first 40 tables correctly solved in the real effort task. In our experiment the 
threshold of 40 tables solved was calibrated based on the results of pilot sessions in order to 
obtain a similar degree of dispersion between our measure of competence and our measure of 
honesty (as we will show later, this was achieved), and to ensure that everyone was able to pass 
it. In particular, we wanted to avoid that the voting decisions of the subjects were biased 
towards one characteristic or the other because of the different degree of variation of the two 
characteristics. 
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Both competence and honesty in Stage 1 are positively correlated with competence and 
honesty in Stage 2 (Spearman’s ρ = 0.86 and 0.76, and p < 0.001 for both; all reported p values 
in the paper are two-tailed, and all bivariate tests are estimated taking subject level averages in 
order to avoid the problem of non-independence of within-subject observations). Similarly, the 
profits generated by a given subject are also positively correlated across stages (Spearman’s ρ 
= 0.79, p < 0.001).  The correlation between honesty and competence is close to zero and far 
from being significant in both stages (Spearman’s ρ = −0.049,  p = 0.648 in Stage 1, and ρ = 
0.022,  p = 0.835 in Stage 2). While competence significantly increases from Stage 1 to 2 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001), honesty decreases (p = 0.039). Both trends are probably 
explained by learning. It is also worth noting that the mean level of honesty/dishonesty 
displayed by our participants is in line with the behavior found in previous truth-telling 
experiments indicating that many people are willing to truthfully reveal all or part of their 
private information even when there is no penalty from lying. In particular, 17.78% (22.22% 
in the second stage) of the subjects act as income maximizers by reporting the minimum 
amount. This is in line with the proportion of income maximizers estimated, for instance, in 
die roll experiments. Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) estimate, for example, a 22% of income 
maximizers, while Dai et al. (2017) a 28%. More details on the honesty of the subjects is 
reported in the online appendix. 
Table 1: Competence and Honesty 
 Competence Honesty 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Stage 1 40.17 15.83 0.45 0.31 
Stage 2 51.44 17.80 0.39 0.28 
 Before analyzing the electoral choices of the subjects, it is useful to provide an 
overview of the electoral situations faced by our participants.8 We can calculate how much 
competence and honesty information from Stage 1 varies across candidates (both real and 
fictional) in the electoral situations faced by our participants. The coefficient of variation for 
competence, measured as the standard deviation over the mean, is 0.407. The coefficient of 
variation for honesty is 0.400. The normalized measure of dispersion, captured by the 
                                                             
8 The online appendix provides more information about the variation of the decision problems faced by the 
subjects. Note that, due to a technical problem during the voting stage of one session in the Beliefs treatment, the 
information about honesty and competence of some candidates were displayed as 0s in the computer screen of 
certain voters. This problem affected 12 voting choices which we dropped from the analysis. If we completely 
remove the participants who were affected by this programming error, our results do not change (see online 
appendix). 
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coefficient of variation, is very similar between competence and honesty. This means that the 
voting decisions of the subjects could not be affected by a different degree of dispersion 
between the two variables. 
To analyze the electoral choices of subjects, we consider three alternative approaches 
and verify whether the results are consistent across them. One approach assumes that subjects 
have adaptive expectations, that is they form their expectations about how the potential public 
official will behave in the future based on the information provided to them regarding the past 
competence and honesty of the candidates. In this approach, expected competence (honesty) 
coincides with the level of competence (honesty) displayed by a given candidate in stage 1, 
and the expected earnings of stage 2 follow from Equation 1 (see theoretical background) using 
stage 1’s honesty and competence. 
A second approach assumes that subjects have rational expectations (i.e. on-average 
correct beliefs). This means that subjects can, based on the information provided to them on 
stage 1’s behavior, estimate how much weight should be given to stage 1’s honesty and 
competence respectively in order to maximize stage 2’s earnings. To estimate the weights that 
a voter with rational expectations should place on honesty and competence based on stage 1’s 
information, we estimate the following linear regression:  
ln(𝜋2) = ln(𝐴) + 𝛼𝐻
𝑅ln (𝐻1) + 𝛼𝐶
𝑅ln (𝐶1) + 𝜀                               (7) 
Where 𝜋2 is the stage 2’s earnings generated by each subject as public official, 𝐻1 (𝐶1) 
is the level of honesty (competence) of each subject in stage 1, and 𝐴 is the constant multiplier 
of the profit function (equal to 4/3). 𝜀  is the error term which is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. This model yields the rational-expectations weights 
of honesty and competence (𝛼𝐻
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐶
𝑅)  that voters should use in their utility function, and 
provides a benchmark for the empirical estimations of 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐶 . When we estimate (7), we 
find that 𝛼𝐶
𝑅 is slightly larger than 𝛼𝐻
𝑅  (0.97 vs. 0.77 in the No Beliefs treatment, and 0.98 vs. 
0.86 in the Beliefs treatment), but significantly so only in the No Beliefs treatment (p = 0.018). 
This means that a rational and profit-maximizing voter with rational expectations should place 
a slightly larger weight on past competence than past honesty (at least in the No Beliefs 
treatment). From Equation (1), we can then compute the stage 2’s earnings that a voter with 
rational expectations should expect from each candidate as: 
 𝜋2 = A 𝐻1
𝛼𝐻
𝑅
𝐶1
𝛼𝐶
𝑅
𝑒̅𝜀                                                   (8) 
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where 𝑒̅𝜀 is the mean of a log-normally distributed random variable and is equal to 𝑒
𝜎2
2 .  
The third approach uses the stated beliefs reported by the subjects regarding the future 
behavior of the candidates. This means that, in Equations 1-6, expected competence (honesty) 
coincides with what the subjects reported in the Beliefs treatment. The expected earnings of 
stage 2 are then calculated based on these beliefs. 
Of course, none of these approaches are entirely satisfactory and all of them have some 
limitations. For instance, in relation to the adaptive expectations approach, even if the signals 
received by voters about the candidates' past honesty and competence are plausibly correlated 
with perceived honesty and competence, voters may differ in their priors as well as the type of 
belief updating process they use. Similarly, it is often unrealistic to assume that subjects are 
able to predict the ‘correct’ model as a theory of rational expectations would do. Finally, stated 
beliefs are unlikely to perfectly measure each voter’s exact beliefs given the practical issues of 
the different elicitation methods. However, if we find consistent results across these different 
approaches, it will reassure us as to the robustness of the results. The online appendix considers 
a fourth approach, also based on rational expectations, as a further robustness check. Its results 
are in line with those which we find with the other three approaches. 
Table 2: Voting choices 
Treatment Situation Honesty Competence Votes for i Votes for j Tot. 
No Beliefs 
Strict or weak 
dominance 
Ti ≥ Tj 
Ti > Tj 
Ci > Cj 
Ci ≥ Cj 
114 
(98.28%) 
2 
(1.72%) 
116 
(100%) 
Trade-off Ti > Tj Ci < Cj 
196 
(58.68%) 
138 
(41.32%) 
334 
(100%) 
Equality Ti = Tj Ci = Cj . . . 
Beliefs 
(based on actual 
information) 
Strict or weak 
dominance 
Ti ≥ Tj 
Ti > Tj 
Ci > Cj 
Ci ≥ Cj 
97 
(92.38%) 
8 
(7.62%) 
105 
(100%) 
Trade-off Ti > Tj Ci < Cj 
161 
(48.35%) 
172 
(51.65%) 
333 
(100%) 
Equality Ti = Tj Ci = Cj . . . 
Total 
Strict or weak 
dominance 
Ti ≥ Tj 
Ti > Tj 
Ci > Cj 
Ci ≥ Cj 
211 
(95.48%) 
10 
(4.52%) 
221 
(100%) 
Trade-off Ti > Tj Ci < Cj 
357 
(53.52%) 
310 
(46.48%) 
667 
(100%) 
Beliefs  
(based on 
subjects’ beliefs) 
Strict or weak 
dominance 
Ti ≥ Tj 
Ti > Tj 
Ci > Cj 
Ci ≥ Cj 
155 
(90.64%) 
16 
(9.36%) 
171 
(100%) 
Trade-off Ti > Tj Ci < Cj 
140 
(53.23%) 
123 
(46.77%) 
263 
(100%) 
Equality Ti = Tj Ci = Cj 
4 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
4 
(100%) 
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We first consider the number of times subjects voted for a candidate for each possible 
electoral situations that occurred in the experiment (Table 2). Electoral situations are either 
defined based on the candidates’ past levels of honesty and competence (approaches based on 
adaptive or rational expectations) or the voters’ beliefs about the honesty and competence of 
the candidates (approach based on stated beliefs). Recall that the approach based on rational 
expectations differs from the one based on adaptive expectations in the way subjects weigh 
past honesty and competence, and how they compute the expected earnings. In defining the 
electoral situations, the two approaches are indistinguishable. Two main observations can be 
made from Table 2. First, if we look at the situations where there is no trade-off between 
honesty and competence, only in a very small proportion of cases – in 10 out of 221 (i.e. 4.52%) 
– subjects displayed what we refer as an inconsistent voting behavior: they voted for the 
candidate who was strictly dominated in both characteristics (honesty and competence) by the 
other candidate. This proportion is very small in the No Beliefs (1.72% of cases with 
inconsistent voting behavior), and larger in the Beliefs treatment, both if we consider the past 
levels of competence and honesty (7.62% of cases with inconsistent voting behavior) or the 
stated beliefs (9.36%). A possible explanation of why there is more inconsistent voting 
behavior in the Beliefs treatment compared to the No Beliefs treatment is that the task is more 
cognitively demanding in the Beliefs treatment (subjects express their beliefs and select a 
candidate in ten consecutive voting situations), and, therefore, it is more likely to make a 
mistake. The behavior of these subjects (from now on, we will label them as inconsistent 
subjects) is difficult to characterize and interpret. It is likely that they made random choices 
during the experiment or did not take the experiment seriously. Hence, we control for their 
behavior in the remainder of the analysis (in non-parametric tests and figures, we replicate the 
analysis excluding the inconsistent subjects; in regressions, we directly control for their 
behavior with the inclusion of a dummy variable on the right-hand side). Only four subjects 
(8.89%) were inconsistent both based on their beliefs and the information provided to them 
about the competence and honesty of the candidates. 
Second, in the interesting situations where there is a trade-off between honesty and 
competence, Table 2 tells us that subjects sometimes vote for the more honest candidate 
(overall, in 54% of the cases) while some other times they choose the more competent one 
(46%). The proportion of votes towards the more honest candidate is higher in the No Beliefs 
treatment than in the Beliefs treatment (59% vs. 48%). Subjects who participated in the Beliefs 
treatment sessions might have been induced to rely less on the information provided to them 
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and focus more on their beliefs about the characteristics of the candidates to cast their votes. If 
we construct the possible electoral situations based on the beliefs of the subjects, we find that 
subjects voted for the more honest candidate in 53% of the cases. 
Of course, this very preliminary analysis of the voting behavior does not take into 
account the number of cases in which competence and honesty respectively are associated to 
profitability. In about 73% of the cases, the more competent candidate was in fact also the more 
profitable from the standpoint of a voter with adaptive expectations. This happened by chance 
and is something that we addressed in the design of electoral situations in Experiment 2 (see 
Section 6). This percentage is equal to 67% if we consider rational expectations, and 74% if 
we look at the stated beliefs of the subjects. This means that people often did not vote for the 
more competent candidate when he or she was the more profitable one, and preferred instead 
the less profitable and more honest candidate. 
 
Figure 1: Probability of electing the more honest candidate 
Panel A: Adaptive expectations 
 
Panel B: Rational expectations 
  
Panel C: Stated beliefs 
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 Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more honest candidate. Δπ is the difference in expected payoffs 
between the more and less honest candidate. In Panel A, the expected payoffs are computed based on past (stage 
1’s) competence and honesty; in Panel B, based on the re-weighted values of past competence and honesty as it 
is indicated in Equation 8; in Panel C, based on the stated beliefs of the subjects. The running means are weighted 
to give more importance to near points than far, and computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). The 
data correspond to cases where there is a trade-off between honesty and competence. 
Figure 1 considers the probability of electing the more honest candidate as a function 
of the difference in expected payoffs Δπ between the more and less honest candidate, according 
to adaptive expectations (Panel A), rational expectations (Panel B) and stated beliefs (Panel C). 
In all graphs of Figure 1, the probability is obtained by computing the weighted running means 
of a dichotomous variable taking value 1 when the honest candidate is elected and 0 otherwise. 
For Δπ < 0 (i.e. the more honest candidate is also the less profitable), profit-maximizing 
subjects should vote for the less honest candidate as he or she is associated with higher expected 
payoffs. Hence, the green area below the smoothed means measures the extent to which 
subjects vote for the more honest candidate when this is not the more profitable candidate. For 
Δπ > 0 (i.e., the more honest candidate is also the more profitable), profit-maximizing subjects 
should vote for the more honest candidate as he or she is associated with higher expected 
payoffs. Hence, the yellow area above the smoothed means measures the extent to which 
subjects vote for the more competent candidate when this is not the more profitable candidate. 
Note that the theoretical predicted probability under rational and self-interest behavior would 
follow a step function where the voter never chooses the more honest candidate in the region 
where Δπ < 0, and always chooses him or her when Δπ > 0. 
As Figure 1 shows, choices fairly follow a pattern based on the rational self-interested 
prediction in all graphs, in some preliminary support of Theoretical Result 1. However, it also 
shows that a non-trivial proportion of the voting behavior display either a bias towards honesty 
(i.e. area below the weighted running means for Δπ < 0) or towards competence (i.e. area above 
the weighted running means for Δπ > 0). The bias towards honesty also appears to be much 
bigger than the one towards competence (i.e. the green area is larger than the yellow area). This 
preliminary evidence indicates that subjects seem more likely to vote for the less profitable 
candidate when this is the more honest rather than competent one. This evidence appears to be 
stronger in the No Beliefs treatment (middle graphs of Panels A and B), and in the Beliefs 
treatment when we construct the voting situations based on the beliefs of subjects (Panel C). It 
also seems unaffected by the type of expectations (adaptive vs. rational) that we consider. 
Additional analysis (reported in the online appendix and based on a different specification of 
the voters’ utility function) suggests that the bias towards competence observed in Figure 1 
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may as well be the results of random noise (i.e. honesty-biased or expected value maximizing 
individuals sometimes mistakenly choosing the more competence but less profitable candidate). 
For each graph of Figure 1, we can provide a measure of the two areas representing the 
biases toward honesty and competence by computing how often subjects vote for the more 
honest candidate when the latter is the less profitable one, and how often they voted for the 
more competent candidate when the latter is the less profitable one (we also have seven or 
fewer cases of perfect profit equality, depending on the belief estimation approach). The first 
measure is equal to 40.24% in Panel A (43.45% in the No Beliefs treatment, and 37.04% in the 
Beliefs treatment), 43.91% in Panel B (47.71% in the No Beliefs treatment, and 40.11% in the 
Beliefs treatment), and 39.92% in Panel C, and it captures the proportion of voting behavior 
biased towards honesty. The second measure is 11.67% in Panel A (6.06% in the No Beliefs 
treatment, and 17.68% in the Beliefs treatment), 7.92% in Panel B (0.81% in the No Beliefs 
treatment, and 15.38% in the Beliefs treatment), 9.05% in Panel C, and it captures the 
proportion of voting behavior biased towards competence. We can also estimate the fraction of 
rational voting behavior which is equal to 48.09% in Panel A (i.e. 100% − 40.24% − 11.67%), 
48.17% in Panel B (i.e. 100% − 43.91% − 7.92%), and 51.03% in Panel C (i.e. 100% − 39.92% 
− 9.05%).  
To provide formal tests of these biases, we can exploit the fact that we have multiple 
observations per subject. In particular, we can measure, for each voter, the average vote 
(calculated as the mean of a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the candidate is voted, and 0 
otherwise) for the more honest candidate when the latter is the less profitable one, and compare 
it with the average vote for the more competent candidate when the latter is the less profitable 
one. Both the average vote towards honesty and towards competence are non-zero in all graphs 
of Figure 1. This suggests that both biases are broadly relevant. The bias towards honesty is 
however significantly larger (more than thrice as bigger) than the bias towards competence 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). These results do not change if we exclude the 
inconsistent subjects. We also conducted the same non-parametric tests (available upon request) 
for each interval of absolute deviation in expected payoffs between two candidates (these 
intervals were the same used in the design phase of the experiment to generate the fictitious 
situations). In other words, we computed, for each voter and each interval of absolute deviation 
in expected payoffs between the candidates, the average vote for the less profitable and more 
competent candidate, and for the less profitable and more honest candidate respectively. We 
then compared, for each voter, these two average votes using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In 
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those intervals where we have enough observations to ensure statistical power, the proportion 
of cases where subjects voted for the unprofitable and more honest candidate is significantly 
larger than the proportion of cases where subjects voted for the unprofitable and more 
competent candidate. 
We can also compute how much subjects gave up, on average, by overweighting 
honesty or overweighting competence. Assuming adaptive expectations, subjects gave up 
about 8.50 experimental points (i.e. 1.7 euros) and up to 42.72 experimental points (i.e. 8.54 
euros) by overweighting honesty, while they gave up about 5.34 experimental points (i.e. 1.07 
euros) and up to 19.51 experimental points (i.e. 3.90 euros) by overweighting competence. 
Assuming rational expectations, they gave up about 11.17 experimental points (i.e. 2.3 euros) 
and up to 51.25 experimental points (i.e. 10.25 euros) by overweighting honesty, while they 
gave up about 7.30 experimental points (i.e. 1.50 euros) and up to 24.39 experimental points 
(i.e. 4.90 euros) by overweighting competence. If we compute the efficiency loss according to 
the subjects’ stated beliefs, voters were willing to sacrifice, on average, 7.14 (5.56) 
experimental points, and up to 31.47 points (11.33 points), to vote for the more honest 
(competent) candidate. Since the bias towards honesty is much more common than the one 
towards competence, the overall efficiency loss (i.e. the sum of all single losses) is more than 
15 times bigger for overweighting honesty than competence.  
To sum up, these results indicate that, in aggregate, voters care about both competence 
and honesty but they weighed honesty much more than competence. In terms of the theoretical 
results presented earlier, this suggests that both 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  are positive (and, possibly, both 
greater than 1), and also that 𝛼𝐻 is greater than 𝛼𝐶 . In the next section, we provide an estimation 
of 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐶  using regression analysis. 
5.2 Regression analysis 
Based on the theoretical background presented in Section 4, we estimate the probability 
that a subject votes for a certain candidate i based on the differences in log honesty and log 
competence of the alternative candidates (see Equation 6). We focus on cases where there is a 
trade-off between competence and honesty. Since we have multiple observations per individual, 
we employ robust standard errors clustered at individual level. In the online appendix, we also 
report a regression analysis where only the “real” candidates are included. While this 
drastically reduces the number of observations, the results remain qualitatively the same. We 
conduct separate regressions for each treatment (Regressions 1-2 for the No Beliefs treatment, 
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Regressions 3-6 for the Beliefs treatment). The dependent variable is the dummy ‘Vote’ which 
is equal to 1 if candidate i is chosen. In Regressions 1 and 3, the independent variables are the 
differences in log of past honesty and competence of the candidates, Δln(honesty) and 
Δln(competence). In Regressions 2 and 4, we also control for the risk attitude of the voters, the 
behavior of the voters in the first stage of the experiment (own competence and honesty), and 
the behavior of the inconsistent subjects (with a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a subject 
is categorized as inconsistent) by interacting each of these variables with Δln(honesty) and 
Δln(competence). Regressions 5 and 6 are like Regressions 3 and 4 except that we measure 
honesty and competence with the stated beliefs of the subjects. Table 3 displays the results of 
the regressions. To study whether the results are robust if we assume rational expectations, we 
do not need to run additional regressions but we can simply test whether the ratio of the 
coefficients for Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) estimated in each of the Regressions 1-4 is 
different from the ratio of the weights (𝛼𝐶
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐻
𝑅 ) that a voter with rational expectations 
should place on honesty and competence based on stage 1’s information. An alternative 
approach is to rescale all values of honesty and competence by 𝛼𝐶
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐻
𝑅  and test, in 
analogous regressions to 1-4, whether the coefficients for Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) 
are equal or not. This second approach, however, does not account for the fact that 𝛼𝐶
𝑅 and 𝛼𝐻
𝑅  
have been estimated from the data. 
Table 3: Logit regressions 
 
Regression 1 
(No Beliefs treatment, 
Adaptive 
expectations) 
Regression 2 
(No Beliefs treatment,  
Adaptive 
expectations) 
Regression 3 
(Beliefs treatment, 
Adaptive 
expectations) 
 b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 5.47*** 1.59 7.77*** 1.28 5.26*** 1.03 
Δln(competence) 2.81*** 0.82 4.40*** 0.71 3.28*** 0.59 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice   0.76 0.87   
Δln(competence) × risk choice   0.2 0.41   
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty   -2.96** 1.33   
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty   -1.85** 0.77   
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence   -2.47 2.76   
Δln(competence) × voter's 
competence 
  -1.21 1.24   
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency   -3.69 2.43   
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency   -6.70*** 1.54   
Obs 334  334   333  
Df 2  9 
 2  
Prob > F 0.002  0.000  0.000  
 
Regression 4 
(Beliefs treatment, 
Adaptive 
expectations) 
Regression 5 
(Beliefs treatment, 
Stated beliefs) 
Regression 6 
(Beliefs treatment, 
Stated beliefs) 
 b se b se b se 
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Δln(honesty) 6.20*** 1.04 5.88*** 0.97 7.24*** 1.02 
Δln(competence) 3.68*** 0.58 3.53*** 0.69 4.15*** 0.7 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice 0.45 0.6   0.80** 0.4 
Δln(competence) × risk choice 0.18 0.32   0.79** 0.39 
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty -1.44 1.15   -0.82 1.1 
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty -1.10* 0.63   -0.8 0.8 
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence -3.18 2.54   -1.91 1.55 
Δln(competence) × voter's 
competence 
-1.55 1.49 
  
-0.37 0.72 
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency -1.03 2.05   -2.11 1.79 
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency 0.32 1.09   -0.65 1.33 
Obs 333  263 263  
Df 10  2 10  
Prob > F 0.000  0.008 0.000  
Notes: Logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. Tests under the assumption of rational expectations 
can be derived and are analyzed in the main text. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. 
“Risk choice”, “voter’s honesty” and “voter’s competence” are centered at the mean in order to control for high 
correlation between the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). The data correspond to cases where there 
is a trade-off between honesty and competence. Obs = number of observations. Df = degrees of freedom. Prob > 
F = Wald test. Differences in the number of observations reflect the fact that we have different number of trade-
off cases across treatments. Variables that do not vary over the choices of the voters (e.g. indivdual characteristics 
of the voters), by construction, enter the model only as interaction terms. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
 In all regressions, both the coefficients of Δ log of honesty ( 𝛼𝐻 ) and Δ log of 
competence (𝛼𝐶 ) are positive and significant. The absolute size of these coefficients is a 
measure of how precise subjects are in their decisions (the larger the coefficient, the more 
precise the subjects are). Since the coefficient of Δln(honesty) is significantly larger (almost 
twice as big) than the coefficient of Δln(competence) (χ2 test, p < 0.01 for all regressions), it 
indicates that subjects have a bias towards honesty and this is much more common and larger 
than the one towards competence. We can also test whether the ratio of the estimated 
coefficients 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  is significantly larger than the ratio of the rational-expectations weights 
of past honesty and competence (𝛼𝐻
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐶
𝑅). This is true for all regressions (χ2 test, p < 0.01). 
Result 1. Subjects tended to weigh honesty more than competence, as predicted by 
Theoretical Result 2. 
Result 2. The bias towards caring about honesty is robust to whether we explain the 
decisions of subjects with adaptive expectations, rational expectations or their stated beliefs 
about honesty and competence. 
Results 1 and 2 also hold in Regressions 2, 4 and 6 where we control for the risk attitude 
and behavior of the voters.9  
                                                             
9 The effects of the individual characteristics are not robust across regressions. In Regression 2, we find that more 
honest voters tend to make less precise choices (𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  are both smaller), while inconsistent subjects value 
competence even less than consistent subjects. Regression 6 indicates that less risk averse subjects make slightly 
more precise choices (𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  are both larger). 
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 6. Experiment 2: experimental design 
We conducted Experiment 2 at the GATE lab between January and March 2016. 99 
subjects participated in the experiment (none of them had participated in Experiment 1). 
Experiment 2 acts as a robustness check of Experiment 1 and provides some complementary 
results. Specifically, it controls for two potential confounds.  
A first potential confound concerns the fact that, in Experiment 1, subjects were told 
that their decisions in Stage 1 “may be reported to other participants at later stages of the 
experiment”. While they were not told what the second stage of the experiment consisted of 
before participating in the first stage (to isolate the two stages from a theoretical perspective), 
this information raises the potential criticism of ‘strategic’ behavior in Stage 1. This concern 
applies especially to our measure of honesty. If subjects guess that their reports could be used 
against them in the future, they may artificially inflate their level of honesty. Our data do not 
seem to support this hypothesis. As we said earlier, we find that our subjects display a similar 
income maximizing behavior as other truth-telling experiments. In addition, voters do rely on 
Stage 1 behavior (and especially the information about honesty) when they select the public 
official. If behavior in Stage 1 is strategic as conjectured, subjects should disregard or discount 
the information they receive about the candidates. Similarly, they should adjust their beliefs to 
account for the potential strategic behavior of the candidates in Stage 1. However, our results 
hold even if we base our analysis on the voters’ beliefs. To dissipate any further concerns 
regarding potential strategic behavior in Stage 1, we ran, in Experiment 2, the No Disclosure 
treatment (54 subjects), where we removed from the instructions the following sentence: “The 
information you provide in each stage of the experiment may be reported to other participants 
at later stages of the experiment”. For the rest, the treatment was identical to the Beliefs 
treatment of Experiment 1. 
A second potential confound is that the bias towards honesty that we observe in 
Experiment 1 may not be driven by a preference for honesty per se but rather inequality 
aversion. An inequality averse voter can in fact obtain a more equal distribution of the payoffs 
if he or she votes for the more honest candidate. Similarly, in Experiment 1, we do not know 
whether a voter selects the more honest candidate because he or she wants to reward him or 
her (preferences for honest people) or because he or she simply cares about the resulting 
behavior (preferences for honest acts). To control for inequality aversion and isolate the 
preferences for honest people from the preferences for honest acts, we ran a second treatment 
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with 45 subjects (Extra Endowment treatment). This treatment was identical to the Beliefs 
treatment of Experiment 1 except that we gave 20 euros extra to each non-appointed participant 
in both Stages 1 and 2 such that inequality is now minimized if the less honest subject is elected. 
To make sure that the extra endowment was big enough to cover all possible cases and to keep 
payments comparable across treatments, we also reduced the exchange rate to 1 point = 5 Euro 
cents. Note that, in this second treatment, we do not neutralize inequality aversion but we direct 
its effects against the hypothesis that people have a bias towards honest acts. Similarly, if 
subjects had intention-based or reciprocal preferences predicting that you should be nice if 
someone is expected to be nice to you, this too should work against a honesty bias in this setting. 
As such, we have a hard test of this bias.  
The above test for inequality aversion plausibly assumes that subjects care more about 
disadvantageous inequality than advantageous inequality (as in Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). As 
an additional and more general control for inequality aversion, we also collected a measure of 
inequality aversion in both treatments of Experiment 2 (other than for one session – 9 subjects 
– of the No Disclosure treatment). In particular, at the end of the experiment, we included 
Kerschbamer’s (2015) standard incentivized measurement of inequality aversion. In this task, 
each subject made 10 different binary allocation choices between himself/herself and another 
subject (details on the 10 decisions are provided in the online appendix).  One decision was 
randomly chosen for the payment. All the other experimental procedures of Experiment 2 were 
identical to those used in Experiment 1 (note also that in Experiment 2 we always elicited 
subjects’ beliefs).10  
7. Experiment 2: experimental results 
7.1 Descriptive and aggregate results 
In this section, we briefly consider the main findings of Experiment 2. First, we can 
check whether there is any difference in competence and honesty in the first stage compared to 
Experiment 1. If we compare the No Disclosure treatment with the baseline treatment of 
Experiment 1 (the No Beliefs treatment), we find no difference both in first stage competence 
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.720) and honesty (p = 0.290). This evidence goes against the 
                                                             
10 See the online appendix for details on the variation in electoral situations faced by participants in Experiment 
2. In Experiment 2, we also improved the algorithm used to construct the fictional situations in order to have a 
more balanced dataset. In Experiment 1, the trade-off situations were constructed irrespectively of which 
characteristic (honesty or competence) was going to be associated to more profitability. In Experiment 2, roughly 
half of the trade-off situations were built such that the more honest candidate was also the more profitable, while 
the other half such that the more competent candidate was the more profitable. 
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hypothesis that people are strategic in the first stage of Experiment 1.  We will verify later 
whether there is a change in subjects’ voting behavior.  
If we turn to the Extra Endowment treatment and compare it to the baseline treatment 
of Experiment 1, we find no difference in first stage competence (p = 0.315). In contrast, we 
find that subjects are significantly less honest in the Extra Endowment treatment than in 
Experiment 1 (p = 0.014). This is not surprising since, in the Extra Endowment, non-appointed 
participants always earn more money than the public official. Hence, subjects who weigh 
equality more than honesty should, in the Extra Endowment treatment, misreport the value of 
the common fund if they want to reduce inequality. 
All the other stastistics regarding our measures of honesty and competence and the 
distribution of the electoral situations are in line with what we found in Experiment 1. In 
particular, both competence and honesty in Stage 1 are positively correlated with competence 
and honesty in Stage 2 for both treatments of Experiment 2 (Spearman’s ρ > 0.86 for 
competence, Spearman’s ρ > 0.81 for honesty, and p < 0.001 for all tests). Competence 
significantly increases from Stage 1 to 2 in all treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p < 
0.001), while honesty decreased but only if we pool the treatments together (p = 0.041). The 
profits generated by a given subject are positively correlated across stages (Spearman’s ρ = 
0.79 p < 0.001).  There is no significant correlation between honesty and competence in Stage 
1 (Spearman’s ρ = −0.108, p = 0.285) as well as in Stage 2 (Spearman’s ρ = 0.153, p = 0.132). 
As in Experiment 1, competence and honesty have a very similar degree of variation across 
candidates in both treatments of Experiment 2. The coefficient of variation for competence 
(honesty) is 0.417 (0.448) in the No Disclosure treatment, and 0.413 (0.454) in the Extra 
Endowment treatment. The level of inconsistent voting behavior is similar to the Beliefs 
treatment of Experiment 1 if we consider the past levels of competence and honesty (7.81% in 
the No Disclosure treatment, and 6.73% in the Extra Endowment treatment). It is larger if we 
consider the subjects’ beliefs about competence and honesty (15.7% and 17%). 
Before analyzing the voting behavior of the subjects, we can first estimate the weights 
– 𝛼𝐶
𝑅 and 𝛼𝐻
𝑅  – that a voter with rational expectations should place on honesty and competence 
based on stage 1’s information. From equation (7), we can estimate the values of 𝛼𝐶
𝑅 and 𝛼𝐻
𝑅 . 
We find that 𝛼𝐶
𝑅 is slightly larger than 𝛼𝐻
𝑅  (0.95 vs. 0.74 in the No Disclosure treatment, and 
0.97 vs. 0.81 in the Extra Endowment treatment; p < 0.01 for both comparisons). This confirms 
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what we found for Experiment 1: a rational and profit-maximizing voter with rational 
expectations should place a slightly larger weight on past competence than past honesty. 
We can now turn to the voting behavior of the subjects in Experiment 2. Focusing on 
the trade-off cases, we can plot the probability of electing the more honest candidate as a 
function of the difference in expected payoffs Δπ between the more and less honest candidate 
(as we did for Experiment 1 in Figure 1). This is reported in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Probability of electing the more honest candidate (Experiment 2) 
Panel A: Adaptive expectations 
 
Panel B: Rational expectations 
 
Panel C: Stated beliefs 
 
Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more honest candidate. Δπ is the difference in expected payoffs 
between the more and less honest candidate. The running means are weighted to give more importance to near 
34 
 
points than far, and computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). The data correspond to cases where there 
is a trade-off between honesty and competence. 
The patterns in Figure 2 are similar to those observed in Figure 1 for Experiment 1. In 
particular, the voting behavior is both characterized by a bias towards honesty (i.e. area below 
the weighted running means for Δπ < 0) and a bias towards competence (i.e. area above the 
weighted running means for Δπ > 0). The former is however significantly much larger than the 
latter (46.23% vs. 14.13% in the No Disclosure treatment based on adaptive expectations, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test p < 0.001; 50.90% vs. 11.82% in the No Disclosure treatment based 
on rational expectations, Wilcoxon signed-rank test p < 0.001; 46.69% vs. 14.74% in the No 
Disclosure treatment using stated beliefs, p < 0.001; 49.04% vs. 17.30% in the Extra 
Endowment treatment  using adaptive expectations, p < 0.001; 49.67% vs. 13.78% in the Extra 
Endowment treatment using rational expectations, p < 0.001; 43.54% vs. 19.21% in the Extra 
Endowment treatment using stated beliefs, p = 0.012). The fraction of rational voting behavior 
is between 37.28% and 39.64% in the No Disclosure treatment, and between 33.66% and 37.25% 
in the Extra Endowment treatment.  
The results are qualitatively the same if we exclude the inconsistent subjects or conduct 
separate tests for each interval of absolute deviation in expected payoffs between two 
candidates. We also had 7 cases of perfect profit equality, three from the No Disclosure 
treatment (one subject voted for the more honest candidate), and four from the Extra 
Endowment treatment (half of the subjects voted for the more honest candidate). If we base the 
choices on the beliefs, we have 3 cases of perfect profit equality (one in the No Disclosure 
treatment, two in the Extra Endowment treatment). Everyone voted for the more honest 
candidate. 
7.2 Regression analysis 
Table 4: Logit regressions (Experiment 2) 
No Disclosure treatment 
Adaptive expectations Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 b se b se b se 
log(honesty) 3.02*** 0.55 4.11*** 0.67 4.42*** 0.87 
log(competence) 1.84*** 0.38 2.39*** 0.4 2.47*** 0.49 
log(honesty) × risk choice   0.23 0.19 0.27 0.25 
log(competence) × risk choice   0.22 0.19 0.26 0.22 
log(honesty) × voter's honesty   -0.84 0.87 -0.5 1.12 
log(competence) × voter's honesty   -0.47 0.59 -0.16 0.73 
log(honesty) × voter's competence   1.57 2.16 2.86 2.81 
log(competence) × voter's competence   1.88 1.3 3.01* 1.64 
log(honesty) × Inconsistency   -2.07** 0.83 -1.22 0.82 
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log(competence) × Inconsistency   0.05 0.91 0.96 1.04 
log(honesty) × Inequality averse     -1.31 1.16 
log(competence) × Inequality averse     -0.66 0.88 
Obs 402  402  337  
Df 2  10  12  
Prob > F 0  0  0  
Stated beliefs Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
 b se b se b se 
log(honesty) 3.01*** 0.47 4.16*** 0.7 4.20*** 0.81 
log(competence) 1.72*** 0.39 2.58*** 0.48 2.43*** 0.51 
log(honesty) × risk choice   0.07 0.27 0.11 0.38 
log(competence) × risk choice   -0.07 0.24 -0.08 0.29 
log(honesty) × voter's honesty   -1.20** 0.56 -1.25 0.86 
log(competence) × voter's honesty   -0.97* 0.51 -0.92 0.63 
log(honesty) × voter's competence   1.13 1.46 1.56 1.96 
log(competence) × voter's competence   1.81** 0.9 1.95* 1.16 
log(honesty) × Inconsistency   -1.80** 0.9 -0.53 1.27 
log(competence) × Inconsistency   -1.35 0.99 -1.07 1.23 
log(honesty) × Inequality averse     -2.32** 1.11 
log(competence) × Inequality averse     -0.68 1.54 
Obs 321  321  270  
Df 2  10  12  
Prob > F 0  0  0  
Extra Endowment treatment 
Adaptive expectations Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9 
 b se b se b se 
log(honesty) 2.08*** 0.58 2.99*** 0.73 2.85*** 0.71 
log(competence) 1.30*** 0.44 1.61*** 0.5 1.63*** 0.51 
log(honesty) × risk choice   0.03 0.33 0.05 0.32 
log(competence) × risk choice   0.05 0.27 0.05 0.26 
log(honesty) × voter's honesty   0.58 0.69 0.5 0.66 
log(competence) × voter's honesty   -0.32 0.5 -0.39 0.5 
log(honesty) × voter's competence   1.58** 0.64 1.89*** 0.71 
log(competence) × voter's competence   1.60*** 0.54 1.85*** 0.57 
log(honesty) × Inconsistency   -2.63 1.67 -2.42 1.66 
log(competence) × Inconsistency   -0.88 1.35 -0.78 1.37 
log(honesty) × Inequality averse     4.04** 2 
log(competence) × Inequality averse     1.31 1.17 
Obs 339  339  339  
Df 2  10  12  
Prob > F 0.002  0  0  
                     Stated beliefs Regression 10 Regression 11 Regression 12 
 b se b se b se 
log(honesty) 2.32*** 0.47 3.61*** 0.86 3.49*** 0.82 
log(competence) 1.63*** 0.46 2.25*** 0.64 2.37*** 0.65 
log(honesty) × risk choice   0.58*** 0.22 0.60*** 0.2 
log(competence) × risk choice   0.46 0.29 0.48* 0.28 
log(honesty) × voter's honesty   0.92 0.78 0.75 0.72 
log(competence) × voter's honesty   0.1 0.67 -0.04 0.64 
log(honesty) × voter's competence   1.58* 0.83 1.66* 0.86 
log(competence) × voter's competence   1.77** 0.87 1.93** 0.86 
log(honesty) × Inconsistency   -1.37 1 -1.54 0.95 
log(competence) × Inconsistency   -0.2 1.18 -0.43 1.14 
log(honesty) × Inequality averse     5.17 4.39 
log(competence) × Inequality averse     1.69 2.2 
Obs 260  260  260  
Df 2  10  12  
Prob > F 0  0  0  
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Notes: Alternative-specific logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. Tests under the assumption 
of rational expectations can be derived and are analyzed in the main text. The table reports the beta 
coefficients and the standard errors. “Risk choice”, “voter’s honesty” and “voter’s competence” are centered 
at the mean in order to control for high correlation between the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). 
The data correspond to cases where there is a trade-off between honesty and competence. Obs = number of 
observations. Df = degrees of freedom. Prob > F = Wald test. Differences in the number of observations 
reflect the fact that we have different number of trade-off cases across treatments. Variables that do not vary 
over the choices of the voters (e.g. indivdual characteristics of the voters), by construction, enter the model 
only as interaction terms. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
 
Table 4 reports the results of a regression analysis similar to the one presented earlier 
for Experiment 1. In particular, we estimate the probability that a subject votes for a certain 
candidate over the competing one on the difference in honesty and competence between the 
two candidates using logit model. Since we have multiple observations per individual, we 
employ robust standard errors clustered at individual level. We ran separate regressions for the 
No Disclosure (Regressions 1-6) and Extra Endowment (Regressions 7-12) treatments. In 
Regressions 1-3 and 7-9, we employ the (log) differences in past honesty and competence of 
the candidate as explanatory variables, while in Regressions 4-6 and 10-12, we use the (log) 
differences in the beliefs about the honesty and competence of the candidate. Interaction terms 
are the same used in the regression analysis of Experiment 1 except for Regressions 6 and 12 
where we also include the interactions of Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) with a dummy 
variable which captures whether a voter is inequality averse (based on the Kerschbamer’s 
allocation task; only 11 out of 90 subjects displayed an aversion to inequality, 6 in the No 
Disclosure treatment and 5 in the Extra Endowment treatment; a full analysis of Kerschbamer’s 
allocation task is reported in the online appendix). In Regressions 3 and 6, we lose few 
observations since we did not have a measure of inequality aversion in the first session of the 
No Disclosure treatment. As for Experiment 1, we can study whether the results are robust if 
we assume rational expectations. In particular, we can test whether the ratio of the coefficients 
for Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) estimated in each of the Regressions 1-3 and 7-9 is 
different from the ratio of the weights (𝛼𝐶
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐻
𝑅 ) that a voter with rational expectations 
should place on honesty and competence based on stage 1’s information. 
The results are consistent with previous analysis. In all regressions, both the coefficients 
of Δln(honesty) (𝛼𝐻) and Δln(competence) (𝛼𝐶) are positive and significant. The coefficient of 
Δln(honesty) is however significantly larger (ranging from 1.42 to 1.86 times as bigger) than 
the coefficient of Δln(competence) (χ2 test, p < 0.05 for all regressions). The ratio of the 
estimated coefficients 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐶  is also significantly larger than the ratio of the rational-
expectations weights of past honesty and competence for all regressions (χ2 test, p < 0.01). 
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Adding the inequality aversion interaction term as measured by Kerschbamer’s allocation task 
does not remove the honesty bias. We can present the third result. 
Result 3. In aggregate, voters care about both competence and honesty but they weigh 
honesty more than competence even once we control for the potential strategic behavior of 
subjects in Stage 1 (No Disclosure treatment), inequality aversion, intention-based preferences 
and any other preferences for honest candidates (Extra Endowment treatment). 
Result 3 also holds irrespectively of whether we assume that subjects have adaptive 
expectations, rational expectations or we measure competence and honesty based on subjects’ 
stated beliefs. 
8. Types classification analysis 
In analyzing both Experiment 1 and 2, we have considered only aggregate results. We 
recognize that a limitation of our previous analysis is that it is predicated on subjects 
homogeneity and that this could potentially bias our results, even though not clearly in a 
specific direction. In this section, we pool the data of both experiments together to look at 
individual behavior (we do not find significant differences across treatments and experiments 
in our classification below; χ2 test, p > 0.1). In particular, we classify subjects based on their 
pattern of voting behavior. This is possible since we collected multiple observations of voting 
behavior for each subject. We identify 7 categories of subjects. Table 5 summarizes the results 
of this classification while Figure 3 displays the voting pattern of each category (the graph plots 
the probability of electing the more honest candidate as a function of the difference in expected 
payoffs Δπ between the more and less honest candidate). Note that subjects are classified based 
on their patterns of voting behavior. The parameters 𝛼𝐻  and 𝛼𝐶  are not estimated but 
hypothesized from these patterns. 
Table 5: Subjects’ classification based on their voting behavior 
Type Utility AE          RE 
Based on 
Beliefs 
Absolute competence 
𝛼𝐻 = 0 
𝛼𝐶 > 0 
0.53% (1) 0.53% (1) 0% (0) 
Absolute honesty 
𝛼𝐻 > 0 
𝛼𝐶 = 0 
4.76% (9) 4.76% (9) 7.64% (11) 
Relative competence 
𝛼𝐶 > 𝛼𝐻 
𝛼𝐻,𝐶 > 0 
10.58% (20) 5.82% (11) 6.94% (10) 
Relative honesty 
𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐶 
𝛼𝐻,𝐶 > 0 
61.38% (116) 63.49% (120) 38.89% (56) 
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Non-classifiable 
𝛼𝐻 ≠ 𝛼𝐶 
𝛼𝐻,𝐶 > 0 
3.17% (6) 5.29% (10) 5.56% (8) 
Profit maximizing 
𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 
𝛼𝐻,𝐶 > 0 
4.76% (9) 4.76% (9) 7.64% (11) 
Profit minimizing & Inconsistent 𝛼𝐻,𝐶 ≤ 0 14.81% (28) 15.34% (29) 33.33% (48) 
Total  100% (189) 100% (189) 100% (144) 
Notes: Percentage sums may not add up to 100% due to rounding. The number of subjects in each classification 
is in brackets. 
Figure 3: Probability of electing the more honest candidate for different subjects’ categories 
 
Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more honest candidate (computed as the average vote in a given 
interval of difference in expected payoffs). Δπ is the difference in expected payoffs between the more and less 
honest candidate. The category of ‘non-classifiable’ voters is not included. 
 ‘Profit-maximizing’ voters. These subjects always select the more profitable candidate 
irrespectively of his or her competence and honesty. In terms of our theoretical specification, 
the utility of the ‘profit-maximizing’ voters can be characterized by 𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 > 0. Subjects 
that do not fall in the ‘Profit-maximizing’ subjects category are classified as follow.   
‘Absolute competence’ voters. These subjects always select the more competent 
candidate irrespectively of the expected profits. The utility function of these subjects can be 
represented by 𝛼𝐶 > 𝛼𝐻 = 0. 
‘Absolute honesty’ voters. These subjects always select the more honest candidate 
irrespectively of the expected profits. Their utility function can be represented by 𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐶 =
0. 
‘Relative competence’ voters. These subjects select more often the competent candidate 
than the honest candidate. To identify these subjects, we computed, for each subject, the 
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average vote for the honest candidates when these are the least profitable, and compared it with 
the average vote for the competent candidates when these are the least profitable. If the 
difference is positive (i.e. the subject more often votes for the less profitable and honest 
candidate than the less profitable and competent candidate), the subject is categorized as 
‘relative honesty’ subject. If the difference is negative (i.e. the subject more often votes for the 
less profitable and competent candidate than the less profitable and honest candidate), the 
subject is categorized as ‘relative competence’ subject. Their behavior can be captured by a 
utility function characterized by 𝛼𝐶 > 𝛼𝐻 > 0. 
‘Relative honesty’ voters. These subjects select more often the honest candidate than 
the competent candidate. Their behavior can be captured by a utility function characterized by 
𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐶 > 0. 
‘Profit-minimizing and Inconsistent’ voters. These subjects tend to select the less 
profitable candidates or display a random voting behavior. This category includes the 
inconsistent subjects (i.e. subjects who select the less profitable subjects when the latter is 
strictly or weakly dominated in both characteristics by the other candidate) and subjects who 
display a negative Spearman rank correlation coefficient between their voting decision and the 
difference in expected profits between the more and less profitable candidate (in other words, 
they display qualitatively the opposite pattern of the theoretical prediction of Figure 1). In terms 
of the parameters of the utility functions, the behavior of the profit-minimizing subjects can be 
captured by 𝛼𝐻 , 𝛼𝐶 ≤ 0. 
‘Non-classifiable’ voters. These subjects are neither profit maximizing, nor ‘absolute 
honesty’ or ‘absolute competence’, nor profit-minimizing/inconsistent. They sometimes vote 
for the less profitable candidate. However, we do not have enough observations to establish 
whether they are relative honesty or relative competence voters. This is either because we have 
only observations where more competence (or more honesty) is always associated to more 
profitability or because the average vote for the honest candidates when these are the least 
profitable is equal to the average vote for the competent candidates when these are the least 
profitable. The behavior of these subjects can be captured by an utility function characterized 
by 𝛼𝐻 ≠ 𝛼𝐶 > 0. 
Table 5 shows that the majority of voters display a relative honesty behavior. About 
two thirds of voters have a preference for the honest candidate (‘Absolute and Relative honesty’ 
voters), and possibly as little as 10% prefer a competent candidate (‘Absolute and Relative 
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competence’ voters). Note that of course this does not mean that these voters do not care about 
expected payoffs. Sacrifices of payoffs often need to be small enough in order for the bias 
towards honesty or competence to emerge.  
While allowing for type heterogeneity, this evidence supports the conclusion that most 
people tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty. In terms of our theoretical 
specification, this means that the majority of the subjects present a utility function which can 
be characterized by 𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐶 > 0. Obviously, this classification should be considered with 
caution and only as complement of the previous analysis as it is based on few electoral 
situations per subject (each subject faced only 10 electoral situations and not all of them were 
trade-off cases). In addition, it only provides a rough indication of the individual values of 𝛼𝐻 
and 𝛼𝐶 . In a future study, it could be interesting to collect more data for each individual in 
order to estimate the α coefficients of the production function directly on an individual level. 
9. Discussion 
We investigated how voters weigh the competence and the honesty of the candidates in 
public elections. Although the focus of this paper is on political elections, the results of our 
study may also be applied to more general contexts, such as elections within organizations (e.g. 
elections of Chair of a Management Board), and, more broadly, to any principal-agent 
relationship where a principal can select an agent among different agents based on their 
competence and honesty. Our controlled experimental environment enabled us to rule out many 
influences that may affect the electoral choices of voters in real life (e.g. political partisanship, 
physical attractiveness, quality and level of information available, etc.). In particular, since, in 
our experiments, candidates differ only on their level of honesty and competence, we are able 
to study the pure preferences of voters for honesty and competence, and the extent to which 
they only care about what they expect will go in their pockets. By and large, we find that most 
voters (about 2/3 using adaptive or rational expectations) tend to be biased towards perceived 
honesty, and this is confirmed in our regression analysis where we controlled for several 
covariates. This also holds irrespectively of whether we assume that voters display adaptive or 
rational expectations, and it is robust against a series of alternative hypotheses, such that 
subjects strategically alter their level of honesty in Stage 1 or are inequality averse or are nice 
towards those who are expected to be nice towards them. In general, we can rule out any social 
preference model that would predict a bias towards the more competent candidate or indeed 
the more honest candidate, as opposed to towards more honest acts. 
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We can rule out the possibility that the bias towards caring about honesty was the result 
of subjects thinking that the competence signal should be weighted less than the honesty signal 
in forming beliefs, hence leading to a seeming honesty bias, for example due to risk aversion. 
We have information from the Beliefs treatment on how stated beliefs relate to the signals. 
Stated beliefs for both competence and honesty closely follow respectively the competence and 
honesty signals, in a similar way (Spearman’s ρ = 0.914 and 0.848, p  < 0.001), with (if anything) 
the signal for competence being weighted slightly more than that for honesty. This also works 
against the possibility that the preference for honest acts is driven by an expectation that the 
honest candidate is more profitable because deemed more altruistic. In order for such a belief 
based mechanism to explain the honesty bias, it should translate into a higher consistency 
between honesty (altruism) signals and stated beliefs about honesty (altruism) than that 
between competence signals and stated beliefs about competence, which we do not find. 
Our experiments build on pilot experiments described in Galeotti and Zizzo (2014, 
2015). We conducted these pilot experiments at the University of East Anglia (UK) between 
March and June 2013, and at the GATE research institute in Lyon (France) in October 2014. 
They verified whether, if we replace an honesty task with a trust game in the early part of the 
experiment, the resulting measured trustworthiness of the public official is weighted more than 
competence in the choice of the public official when an honesty task is still played later. This 
is an acid test of the lower weight placed on competence because, obviously, even allowing a 
connection between honesty and trustworthiness as advocated by Besley’s (2005) fiduciary 
model of politics, the predictive power of a behavioral measure of trustworthiness in one task 
will be less good in predicting behavior in a honesty task than if a behavioral measure in the 
same type of honesty task is provided. Our pilot experiments also provide a test of the 
robustness of results to the use of a CIL procedure and to the use of a different cultural sample 
(U.K. relative to France); and pilot work enabled the calibration of the real effort task to ensure 
roughly the same coefficient of variation in the two signals. In the pilot experiments, we found 
cross-cultural robustness of our results; robustness to the use of the CIL methodology; and, 
while weakened as the honesty signal from a trust game signal is obviously indirect, we still 
find a bias towards honesty. We do not include a full description of these early pilot 
experiments in this paper to help with its readability and length, but the interested reader can 
refer back to Galeotti and Zizzo (2014, 2015). 
One could argue that the bias of the voters towards caring about honesty that we observe 
in our experiments may not be the result of their preferences but of their misunderstanding of 
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the instructions or systematic mistakes in the voting process. This interpretation is not plausible 
for several reasons. First, we made sure that subjects understood the instructions by asking 
them to complete a computerized questionnaire before starting each task, where subjects had 
to solve some exercises and calculate the effects, in terms of payoffs, of their actions. Before 
the start of each task, subjects were invited to ask questions if something was not clear and 
clarifications were offered to them if they had any doubts about the procedures and the 
calculation of the earnings. Second, a lack of understanding or incentives would have resulted 
in random mistakes in both directions. This however was not the case as the bias occurred 
systematically in one direction. Third, in the data analysis, we controlled for the behavior of 
those (few) inconsistent subjects who displayed a more random behavior and could have failed 
to understand the instructions or taken the experiment less seriously. 
We did not give subjects the option not to vote. This is because we wanted to collect, 
for each subject, a clean measure of the extent to which people think that honesty is more 
important than competence or vice versa. Future studies may explore the implications of 
allowing people to abstain from voting. 
The performance in the real effort task may not only be a measure of ability but also 
something related to subjects being bored or lazy. From the perspective of the voters, it does 
not matter whether the public official does not perform well because he or she is unable to do 
the job or because he or she is lazy. Both inability and laziness are dimensions of the incapacity 
of the public official to do his or her job well, and, hence, of his or her incompetence. 
In our design every participant is both a candidate and a voter. One could say that being 
a candidate may change the way participants cast their votes. For instance, subjects may not be 
willing to vote for candidates who are less competent or honest than them, and this might 
explain our bias towards honesty. Our analysis includes regressions where we directly control 
for the own characteristics of the voters (own competence and honesty) by interacting them 
with the honesty and competence of the candidates, and we find that our results are consistently 
robust. The added interactions are either not significant (i.e. in the No Beliefs and No 
Disclosure treatments) or they equally affect both coefficients for honesty and competence and, 
therefore, do not change the result of our comparison between 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶 . Furthermore, we 
find that the honesty bias characterizes all cases including those where none of the candidates 
were less competent or honest than the voter (see the online appendix). It therefore seems 
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implausible that the honesty bias observed in our experiment is driven by the subjects being at 
the same time candidates and voters. 
Another possible criticism of our experiment is that subjects were provided only with 
ex-ante measures of competence and honesty which, from the standpoint of the subjects, may 
not necessarily capture the ex-post behavior of the public official. As a result, people may have 
formed certain beliefs about the ex-post competence and honesty of the public official which 
could have not reflected the information provided to them during the voting phase. We are able 
to control for this possibility in three complementary ways. First, both in Experiment 1 and 2, 
we asked subjects to state their beliefs on the future honesty and competence of the candidates 
(and paid them for accuracy of their guesses), and we find a significant and persistent bias 
towards honesty even when we base our analysis on these elicited beliefs. Second, we analyzed 
the data assuming that the subjects had on-average correct beliefs and predictions of the future 
behavior of the public official (rational expectations). Third, even if subjects scaled up or down 
the information about the honesty and competence of the candidates provided to them, this 
does not change our results since the voting choice that brings the highest utility is the same 
irrespectively of how utility is scaled (or the attributes are scaled).11 
It is also possible that the information about one characteristic (e.g. competence) was 
perceived as less valuable than the information about the other one (e.g. honesty), because the 
former varied substantially more than the other across stages. As a result, a rational and risk 
averse subject could have put a higher weight on the least “noisy” characteristic. However, we 
find that in both experiments honesty in stage 1 was an at least as a noisy or a noisier signal 
than competence in stage 1 in predicting respectively stage 2 honesty and competence. So, if 
anything, subjects should have weighed competence more than honesty, making our results of 
an honesty bias the more striking. 
                                                             
11 This argument applies more generally every time a subject considers the information he or she receives about 
honesty and/or competence imprecise, and, as a result, he or she re-scales it. To illustrate this, suppose that a voter 
n believe that a unit of ex-ante honesty is equivalent to τ units of ex-post honesty. As long as this belief is the 
same for all the candidates (which is reasonable in our case since voters are only informed about the honesty and 
competence of the candidates and nothing else), the voting choice of the voter does not change. More formally, 
the probability that voter n chooses candidate i is the same irrespectively of how the attributes are scaled:  
 𝑃𝑛,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑛,𝑖 > 𝑈𝑛,𝑗) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑛,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑛,𝑗 > 0) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴
∗(𝜏𝐻𝑛𝑖)
𝛼𝐻𝐶𝑛𝑖
𝛼𝐶 − 𝐴∗(𝜏𝐻𝑛𝑗)
𝛼𝐻𝐶𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐶 > 0) =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐴∗𝐻𝑛𝑖
𝛼𝐻𝐶𝑛𝑖
𝛼𝐶 − 𝐴∗𝐻𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐻𝐶𝑛𝑗
𝛼𝐶 > 0) 
In terms of our regression analysis, it means that the beliefs that change the scale of the attributes (honesty and 
competence), do not change the estimation of the parameters 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶 . 
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If all agents are rational and profit-maximizing, the voters should ignore the information 
about honesty and only look at competence since the public official is predicted to maximize 
the number of tables solved correctly and report only 10% of the common fund (implying that 
only competence is relevant to the voters). Our results are however not consistent with this. 
First, the behavior of the candidates is far from being rational and profit-maximizing since they 
report between 39 and 45% of the common fund. Voters also rarely expect the public official 
to report the minimum value to the common fund. Second, if a fraction of the voters believe 
the public official to be rational and profit-maximizing, we should observe a larger weight on 
competence than honesty. We however find the opposite. 
A specific problem with elicited beliefs is that there may be hedging with the voting 
decision. For example, if I feel that a candidate is very honest, I may state a low level of honesty 
for that candidate as a way of insurance. While we cannot entirely rule out this possible effect, 
it is implausible as an issue in our data given the fact that stated beliefs for both competence 
and honestly so closely followed competence and honesty signals.  Furthermore, since the 
correlation is (if anything) slightly lower for honesty than competence, were hedging to be an 
issue, it would work towards place less weight (if anything) on the stated honesty belief than 
on the stated competence belief in making decisions, whereas we still find a clear honesty bias 
if we employ stated beliefs as the true beliefs. 
Finally, our focus has been on voters rather than public officials. One may wonder why 
public officials are honest once elected. In principle this could either be due to a preference for 
truth-telling or due to altruism or other social preferences, but we do not find significant 
differences in honesty among social preferences types as estimated using  Kerschbamer 
(2015)’s social preference elicitation task (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.299). 
10. Conclusions 
Our results show that voters tend to care more about the perceived honesty of candidates. 
While only very few subjects rely exclusively on the information about honesty to cast their 
vote, most of them care about honesty at least conditionally on what they get in their pocket. 
These findings are useful to understand how voters decide in public elections. They do not 
support the idea that what ultimately matters for the voters is just what they earn out of it. On 
the contrary, they indicate that the information about the honesty of the candidates can become 
crucial to determine which candidate will be elected, and so it is not just “the economy, stupid”. 
Obviously, there are limits to the external validity claims that can be made from a single 
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experiment with French university students. The experimental design presented in this paper 
could be extended in a number of directions, for example to look at other voter preferences 
dimensions, at cross-cultural differences, at non University students samples, at repeated 
elections, political experience and the effect of incumbency, at the weighting given to political 
ideologies and same-group affiliations, at more complex and empirically plausible real effort 
tasks, or at the degree of noisiness of signals of quality by different candidates. 
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A. Experimental instructions 
 
A.1 Experiment 1 (instructions are translated from French) 
 
Instructions 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on decision making. The instructions are the same for all participants. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please 
raise your hand if you have any questions at any point during the experiment. If you have any 
questions, the experimenter will come to you and answer your questions privately. If the 
question is relevant to everyone, the experimenter will repeat the answer aloud. 
The experiment consists of two stages. In addition to these two stages, you will be asked some 
individual questions at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of each stage you will 
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receive the corresponding instructions. The information you provide in each stage of the 
experiment may be reported to other participants at later stages of the experiment. However, 
all of your decisions and answers will remain anonymous. 
During this experiment, your earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other 
participants. It is therefore important that you read the instructions with care. Your earnings 
from the experiment will be computed in “points”.  
At the end of the experiment one stage will be chosen at random, and you will be paid the 
points that you earned in that stage. The points that you earn in that stage will be converted 
into euros at an exchange rate of 1 point = 20 cents. In addition to this, you will also be paid a 
show-up fee of 5 euros and any additional earnings that you may obtain by answering the 
questions at the end of the experiment. You will be paid individually and in cash in a separate 
room by a person who is not present during the experiment and who is not aware of the content 
of this experiment. 
First stage 
In this stage of the experiment, you will be matched at random with two other participants. You 
will never interact with these persons again in the remainder of the experiment. You and these 
two participants will be referred to as co-participants. The three of you will have a common 
fund. At the beginning of the task, the value of the common fund will be set to 0 points.  
Every co-participant will individually work on a task. The task is to count the number of 1s in 
a series of tables containing 0s and 1s. The figure shows the kind of screen you will see later: 
 
You will have to enter the number of 1s into the box below the table and click the Submit 
button. After you have submitted your answer, a new table will be generated. You will have 10 
 3 
 
minutes to complete this task. Your remaining time will be displayed in the upper right hand 
corner of the screen. 
Only one co-participant’s work will count for the earnings of this stage of the experiment. This 
co-participant will be referred to as the appointed co-participant. After the appointed co-
participant correctly solves 40 tables, each additional correct answer of the appointed co-
participant will increase the value of the common fund by 4 points. The greater the number of 
tables the appointed co-participant solves correctly over and above the first 40 correctly solved 
tables, the larger the value of the common fund will be. 
At the end of the task, the common fund will have accumulated a certain number of points 
equal to four times the number of tables that the appointed co-participant correctly solved on 
top of the first 40 correctly solved tables. Only the appointed co-participant will know the 
number of tables that he or she correctly solved (and so the value of the common fund). He or 
she will be asked to report the value of the common fund to the other co-participants. He or she 
can report any number between a minimum value of 10% and the true value of the common 
fund. This number corresponds to the reported value of the common fund. The reported value 
of the common fund will be split equally between the co-participants. That is, each co-
participant (including the appointed co-participant) will receive 1/3 of the reported value of the 
common fund. If applicable, the appointed co-participant will also earn the whole of the non-
reported value of the common fund, that is the value of the common fund not reported. Note 
that the appointed co-participant will be free to report or not the true value of the common fund. 
Moreover, the other co-participants will only be informed of the reported value of the common 
fund. 
Example: Suppose the appointed co-participant solves 52 tables correctly (hence 12 tables over 
and above 40 correctly solved tables); the value of the common fund is 12 × 4 = 48. The 
appointed co-participant however reports a value of 33. The non-reported value of the common 
fund is 48 – 33 = 15. The earnings are therefore: 
 33 / 3 = 11 for each non-appointed co-participant; 
 33 / 3 + 15 = 26 for the appointed co-participant. 
How is the appointed co-participant selected? The computer will randomly assign the role 
of appointed co-participant to one of the three co-participants. Each co-participant will be 
informed whether he or she is or not the appointed co-participant only at the end of the 
experiment. Hence, at this stage, every co-participant will have to solve tables and make a 
decision as if he or she were the appointed co-participant.  
The results and earnings for this stage will be communicated to you at the end of the experiment 
and will depend on whether you have been assigned the role of appointed co-participant or not. 
If you are not assigned the role of appointed co-participant, your work and decision will be 
ignored; if you are assigned the role of appointed co-participant, your work and decision will 
determine your and other co-participants’ earnings for this stage. 
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In summary 
 You will be randomly matched with two other participants you will never interact with 
in the remainder of the experiment. You and these two participants will be referred to 
as co-participants. The three of you will have a common fund with an initial value of 0 
points. 
 The computer will randomly assign to one of you the role of appointed co-participant. 
Each co-participant will be informed whether he or she is or not the appointed co-
participant only at the end of the experiment. Hence, at this stage, everyone will work 
and make a decision as if he or she were the appointed co-participant. 
 Everyone will work for 10 minutes on the task which consists in counting 1s in a series 
of tables containing 0s and 1s. If a co-participant is assigned the role of appointed co-
participant, for each table that he or she correctly solves on top of the first 40 correctly 
solved tables, the value of the common fund increases by 4 points. 
 At the end of the task each co-participant will be asked to report any number between 
a minimum value of 10% and the total value of the common fund generated by his or 
her work in case he or she were to be assigned the role of appointed co-participant. If 
the co-participant is indeed the appointed co-participant, this number constitutes the 
reported value of the common fund. At the end of the experiment, the other co-
participants will be informed only about the reported value of the common fund. 
 The reported value of the common fund will be divided in equal parts (each worth 1/3 
of the reported value) between the co-participants (including the appointed co-
participant). If applicable, the appointed co-participant will also earn the whole of the 
non-reported value of the common fund, that is the value of common fund not reported. 
Second stage 
In this stage, you will be randomly matched with two other participants you have never been 
matched with before. As in the first stage, you and these two participants will be referred to as 
co-participants. This second stage is identical to the first one except for the selection of the 
appointed co-participant. 
How is the appointed co-participant selected in the second stage? Before starting the task 
of counting 1s in a series of tables, each co-participant will be placed in 10 situations. Only one 
of these will be real, the others will be fictional. 
In each situation, each co-participant will be informed of: 
 the number of tables correctly solved by each other co-participant in the first stage of 
the experiment;  
 the proportion of the common fund that each other co-participant reported in the first 
stage of the experiment if he or she were to be the appointed co-participant in that stage.  
However, only in the real situation, the information provided is about your actual current co-
participants. In the fictional situations, the information provided is about people who 
participated in past sessions of this experiment. 
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For each situation, each co-participant will be asked to choose which of the two other co-
participants he or she would like to select as the appointed co-participant for this second stage. 
Only the decision of one randomly selected co-participant in the real situation will be 
implemented and count towards your earnings of this stage. Note that, for all you know, each 
situation could be the real one, in which case ALL information you are given about it is true, 
and only the real one may have any effect on who is going to be the appointed co-participant 
in this second stage. Hence, it is in your best interest to treat each situation as if it is real and to 
choose, for each situation, the co-participant that you really want as the appointed co-
participant in this second stage.  
Then the task of counting 1s in a series of tables will start. At the end of the experiment, the 
computer will inform each co-participant whether or not he or she is the appointed co-
participant for this second stage based on the outcome of the real situation.  
{In squared parenthesis, part included only in BELIEFS treatment}  
[Guesses. For each situation, before you choose who you want to select as the appointed co-
participant for this second stage, you will also be asked to indicate how many tables you think 
each co-participant will correctly solve, and what proportion of the common fund you think 
each co-participant will report at the end of the task. At the end of the experiment, the computer 
will randomly draw one of your two guesses about one of your co-participants in the real 
situation (i.e. tables correctly solved or proportion of the common fund reported).  
You will be paid for this randomly drawn guess as follows: 
 If your guess is correct, you will earn an extra 2 euros;  
 if your guess is incorrect by 1 table (in the case the randomly drawn guess is about the 
tables correctly solved) or 1 percentage point (in the case the randomly drawn guess is 
about the proportion of the common fund reported) respectively, you will earn 1 euro and 
90 cents;  
 if your guess is incorrect by 2 tables or 2 percentage points respectively, you will earn 1 
euro and 80 cents;  
 if your guess is incorrect by 3 tables or 3 percentage points respectively, you will earn 1 
euros and 70 cents, and so on: you earn 10 cents less for each additional table or percentage 
point by which you are incorrect;  
 if your guess is incorrect by a number of tables or percentage points respectively greater 
than or equal to 20, you will earn 0 euros.] 
In summary 
 You will be randomly matched with two other participants you have never been 
matched with before. You and these two participants will be referred to as co-
participants. The three of you will have a common fund with an initial value of 0 points. 
 Each co-participant will choose whom he or she wants to select as appointed co-
participant for this second stage between the other two co-participants in different 
situations. Only one of these situations is the real one. The decision of one co-
participant selected at random in the real situation will be implemented. Each co-
participant will be informed whether he or she is or not the appointed co-participant for 
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this second stage only at the end of the experiment. Hence, at this stage, everyone will 
work and make a decision as if he or she were the appointed co-participant for this 
stage. 
 Everyone will work for 10 minutes on the task which consists in counting 1s in a series 
of tables containing 0s and 1s. If a co-participant is assigned the role of appointed co-
participant for this second stage, for each table that he or she correctly solves on top of 
the first 40 correctly solved tables, the value of the common fund increases by 4 points. 
 At the end of the task each co-participant will be asked to report any number between 
a minimum value of 10% and the total value of the common fund generated by his or 
her work in case he or she were to be assigned the role of appointed co-participant for 
this second stage. If the co-participant is indeed the appointed co-participant for this 
second stage, this number constitutes the reported value of the common fund. At the 
end of the experiment, the other co-participants will be informed only about the 
reported value of the common fund. 
 The reported value of the common fund will be divided in equal parts (each worth 1/3 
of the reported value) between the co-participants (including the appointed co-
participant for this second stage). If applicable, the appointed co-participant for this 
second stage will also earn the whole of the non-reported value of the common fund, 
that is the value of common fund not reported. 
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A.2 Experiment 2 
 
The instructions for the No Disclosure treatment (not reported here) are identical to those of 
the Beliefs treatment in Experiment 1 except that we remove from the introduction part the 
following sentence: “The information you provide in each stage of the experiment may be 
reported to other participants at later stages of the experiment. However, all of your decisions 
and answers will remain anonymous”.  
 
Below are the instructions of the Extra Endowment treatment. 
 
Instructions 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on decision making. The instructions are the same for all participants. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please 
raise your hand if you have any questions at any point during the experiment. If you have any 
questions, the experimenter will come to you and answer your questions privately. If the 
question is relevant to everyone, the experimenter will repeat the answer aloud. 
The experiment consists of two stages. In addition to these two stages, you will be asked some 
individual questions at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of each stage you will 
receive the corresponding instructions. The information you provide in each stage of the 
experiment may be reported to other participants at later stages of the experiment. However, 
all of your decisions and answers will remain anonymous. 
During this experiment, your earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other 
participants. It is therefore important that you read the instructions with care. Your earnings 
from the experiment will be computed in “points”.  
At the end of the experiment one stage will be chosen at random, and you will be paid the 
points that you earned in that stage. The points that you earn in that stage will be converted 
into euros at an exchange rate of 1 point = 5 cents. In addition to this, you will also be paid a 
show-up fee of 5 euros and any additional earnings that you may obtain by answering the 
questions at the end of the experiment. You will be paid individually and in cash in a separate 
room by a person who is not present during the experiment and who is not aware of the content 
of this experiment. 
First stage 
In this stage of the experiment, you will be matched at random with two other participants. You 
will never interact with these persons again in the remainder of the experiment. You and these 
two participants will be referred to as co-participants. The three of you will have a common 
fund. At the beginning of the task, the value of the common fund will be set to 0 points.  
Every co-participant will individually work on a task. The task is to count the number of 1s in 
a series of tables containing 0s and 1s. The figure shows the kind of screen you will see later: 
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You will have to enter the number of 1s into the box below the table and click the Submit 
button. After you have submitted your answer, a new table will be generated. You will have 10 
minutes to complete this task. Your remaining time will be displayed in the upper right hand 
corner of the screen. 
Only one co-participant’s work will count for the earnings of this stage of the experiment. This 
co-participant will be referred to as the appointed co-participant. After the appointed co-
participant correctly solves 40 tables, each additional correct answer of the appointed co-
participant will increase the value of the common fund by 4 points. The greater the number of 
tables the appointed co-participant solves correctly over and above the first 40 correctly solved 
tables, the larger the value of the common fund will be. 
At the end of the task, the common fund will have accumulated a certain number of points 
equal to four times the number of tables that the appointed co-participant correctly solved on 
top of the first 40 correctly solved tables. Only the appointed co-participant will know the 
number of tables that he or she correctly solved (and so the value of the common fund). He or 
she will be asked to report the value of the common fund to the other co-participants. He or she 
can report any number between a minimum value of 10% and the true value of the common 
fund. This number corresponds to the reported value of the common fund. The reported value 
of the common fund will be split equally between the co-participants. That is, each co-
participant (including the appointed co-participant) will receive 1/3 of the reported value of the 
common fund. If applicable, the appointed co-participant will also earn the whole of the non-
reported value of the common fund, that is the value of the common fund not reported. Note 
that the appointed co-participant will be free to report or not the true value of the common fund. 
Moreover, the other co-participants will only be informed of the reported value of the common 
fund. The non-appointed co-participants will also receive 300 extra points on top of the 1/3 of 
the reported value of the common fund. 
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Example: Suppose the appointed co-participant solves 52 tables correctly (hence 12 tables over 
and above 40 correctly solved tables); the value of the common fund is 12 × 4 = 48. The 
appointed co-participant however reports a value of 33. The non-reported value of the common 
fund is 48 – 33 = 15. The earnings are therefore: 
 33 / 3 + 300 = 311 for each non-appointed co-participant; 
 33 / 3 + 15 = 26 for the appointed co-participant. 
How is the appointed co-participant selected? The computer will randomly assign the role 
of appointed co-participant to one of the three co-participants. Each co-participant will be 
informed whether he or she is or not the appointed co-participant only at the end of the 
experiment. Hence, at this stage, every co-participant will have to solve tables and make a 
decision as if he or she were the appointed co-participant.  
The results and earnings for this stage will be communicated to you at the end of the experiment 
and will depend on whether you have been assigned the role of appointed co-participant or not. 
If you are not assigned the role of appointed co-participant, your work and decision will be 
ignored; if you are assigned the role of appointed co-participant, your work and decision will 
determine your and other co-participants’ earnings for this stage. 
In summary 
 You will be randomly matched with two other participants you will never interact with 
in the remainder of the experiment. You and these two participants will be referred to 
as co-participants. The three of you will have a common fund with an initial value of 0 
points. 
 The computer will randomly assign to one of you the role of appointed co-participant. 
Each co-participant will be informed whether he or she is or not the appointed co-
participant only at the end of the experiment. Hence, at this stage, everyone will work 
and make a decision as if he or she were the appointed co-participant. 
 Everyone will work for 10 minutes on the task which consists in counting 1s in a series 
of tables containing 0s and 1s. If a co-participant is assigned the role of appointed co-
participant, for each table that he or she correctly solves on top of the first 40 correctly 
solved tables, the value of the common fund increases by 4 points. 
 At the end of the task each co-participant will be asked to report any number between 
a minimum value of 10% and the total value of the common fund generated by his or 
her work in case he or she were to be assigned the role of appointed co-participant. If 
the co-participant is indeed the appointed co-participant, this number constitutes the 
reported value of the common fund. At the end of the experiment, the other co-
participants will be informed only about the reported value of the common fund. 
 The reported value of the common fund will be divided in equal parts (each worth 1/3 
of the reported value) between the co-participants (including the appointed co-
participant). If applicable, the appointed co-participant will also earn the whole of the 
non-reported value of the common fund, that is the value of common fund not reported. 
The non-appointed co-participants will also receive 300 extra points on top of the 1/3 
of the reported value. 
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Second stage 
In this stage, you will be randomly matched with two other participants you have never been 
matched with before. As in the first stage, you and these two participants will be referred to as 
co-participants. This second stage is identical to the first one except for the selection of the 
appointed co-participant. 
How is the appointed co-participant selected in the second stage? Before starting the task 
of counting 1s in a series of tables, each co-participant will be placed in 10 situations. Only one 
of these will be real, the others will be fictional. 
In each situation, each co-participant will be informed of: 
 the number of tables correctly solved by each other co-participant in the first stage of 
the experiment;  
 the proportion of the common fund that each other co-participant reported in the first 
stage of the experiment if he or she were to be the appointed co-participant in that stage.  
However, only in the real situation, the information provided is about your actual current co-
participants. In the fictional situations, the information provided is about people who 
participated in past sessions of this experiment. 
For each situation, each co-participant will be asked to choose which of the two other co-
participants he or she would like to select as the appointed co-participant for this second stage. 
Only the decision of one randomly selected co-participant in the real situation will be 
implemented and count towards your earnings of this stage. Note that, for all you know, each 
situation could be the real one, in which case ALL information you are given about it is true, 
and only the real one may have any effect on who is going to be the appointed co-participant 
in this second stage. Hence, it is in your best interest to treat each situation as if it is real and to 
choose, for each situation, the co-participant that you really want as the appointed co-
participant in this second stage.  
Then the task of counting 1s in a series of tables will start. At the end of the experiment, the 
computer will inform each co-participant whether or not he or she is the appointed co-
participant for this second stage based on the outcome of the real situation.  
Guesses. For each situation, before you choose who you want to select as the appointed co-
participant for this second stage, you will also be asked to indicate how many tables you think 
each co-participant will correctly solve, and what proportion of the common fund you think 
each co-participant will report at the end of the task. At the end of the experiment, the computer 
will randomly draw one of your two guesses about one of your co-participants in the real 
situation (i.e. tables correctly solved or proportion of the common fund reported).  
You will be paid for this randomly drawn guess as follows: 
 If your guess is correct, you will earn an extra 2 euros;  
 if your guess is incorrect by 1 table (in the case the randomly drawn guess is about the 
tables correctly solved) or 1 percentage point (in the case the randomly drawn guess is 
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about the proportion of the common fund reported) respectively, you will earn 1 euro and 
90 cents;  
 if your guess is incorrect by 2 tables or 2 percentage points respectively, you will earn 1 
euro and 80 cents;  
 if your guess is incorrect by 3 tables or 3 percentage points respectively, you will earn 1 
euros and 70 cents, and so on: you earn 10 cents less for each additional table or percentage 
point by which you are incorrect;  
 if your guess is incorrect by a number of tables or percentage points respectively greater 
than or equal to 20, you will earn 0 euros. 
In summary 
 You will be randomly matched with two other participants you have never been 
matched with before. You and these two participants will be referred to as co-
participants. The three of you will have a common fund with an initial value of 0 points. 
 Each co-participant will choose whom he or she wants to select as appointed co-
participant for this second stage between the other two co-participants in different 
situations. Only one of these situations is the real one. The decision of one co-
participant selected at random in the real situation will be implemented. Each co-
participant will be informed whether he or she is or not the appointed co-participant for 
this second stage only at the end of the experiment. Hence, at this stage, everyone will 
work and make a decision as if he or she were the appointed co-participant for this 
stage. 
 Everyone will work for 10 minutes on the task which consists in counting 1s in a series 
of tables containing 0s and 1s. If a co-participant is assigned the role of appointed co-
participant for this second stage, for each table that he or she correctly solves on top of 
the first 40 correctly solved tables, the value of the common fund increases by 4 points. 
 At the end of the task each co-participant will be asked to report any number between 
a minimum value of 10% and the total value of the common fund generated by his or 
her work in case he or she were to be assigned the role of appointed co-participant for 
this second stage. If the co-participant is indeed the appointed co-participant for this 
second stage, this number constitutes the reported value of the common fund. At the 
end of the experiment, the other co-participants will be informed only about the 
reported value of the common fund. 
The reported value of the common fund will be divided in equal parts (each worth 1/3 of the 
reported value) between the co-participants (including the appointed co-participant for this 
second stage). If applicable, the appointed co-participant for this second stage will also earn 
the whole of the non-reported value of the common fund, that is the value of common fund not 
reported. The non-appointed co-participants will also receive 300 extra points on top of the 1/3 
of the reported value.  
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B. Final questionnaire 
 
Note: In Experiment 2, we also included the Kerschbamer (2015)’s task as Part 2. Below, it is 
in squared parenthesis. 
 
Part 1 
You will now be asked to select from among six different gambles the one gamble you would 
like to take. The figure shows the kind of screen you will use to select the gamble.  
  
Each circle represents a different gamble. Each circle is divided in two parts. Each part is a 
possible outcome of the gamble. For every gamble, each outcome is equally likely, that is it 
has a 50% chance of happening. The number of points that the gamble will give for each 
possible outcome is written inside the circle.  
At the end of the experiment, you will roll a six-sided die to determine which outcome of your 
selected gamble will occur: 
 If you roll a 1, 2, or 3, you will receive the points on the left part of the circle.  
 If you roll a 4, 5, or 6, you will receive the points on the right side of the circle.  
Note that, no matter which gamble you pick, each outcome has a 50% chance of occurring. 
To select a gamble you have to click on it with the mouse. You can revise your choice as many 
times as you want. When you are happy with your choice, click the “Confirm your choice” 
button to confirm.  
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Example:  Suppose you select gamble 4 and later you roll a 1, 2, or 3, your earnings will be 4 
points. If you roll 4, 5, or 6, you will earn 13 points. 
- - - - - - - - 
[Part 2 
In this task you have to make 10 decisions. In each of these decisions, the computer will 
randomly match you with another participant in the experiment. We will call the person 
matched with you “your passive person” from now on. The identity of your passive person will 
not be revealed to you at any time. You will see below, why this participant is called “passive 
person”. 
Each of your 10 decisions is a choice between the alternatives LEFT and RIGHT. Each 
alternative has consequences for your own pay-off and the pay-off of your passive person. 
Example: 
You might be asked whether you prefer the alternative LEFT, in which you earn 4.5 points and 
your passive person earns 6.5 points, or the alternative RIGHT, in which you earn 5 points and 
your passive person earns 5 points as well. Subsequently, you will have to decide for one of 
the two alternatives. This decision problem would appear on the screen as: 
LEFT 
Your Choice 
(Please mark) 
RIGHT 
You get 
Passive 
person gets 
 You get 
Passive 
person gets 
4.5 Points 6.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
All in all, you will make 10 such decisions. Your overall profit from this part will be determined 
as follows: 
Pay-off as Active Person 
At the end, one decision is chosen randomly and individually for each participant, and the 
alternative that was selected in the decision situation will be paid out. For instance, in the 
decision situation described above, if you chose the alternative RIGHT, you would receive 5 
points as active person, whereas your passive person would receive 5 points as passive person. 
Pay-off as Passive Person 
In the same way that your passive person receives points from your decision, you receive points 
from another experimental participant without doing anything for it. This means, that you are 
the passive person for another participant. It is ensured that in your roles as active and passive 
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person, you will not be matched with the same participant twice. This means, that if person X 
is your passive person, you are not the passive person of person X. 
You will be able to see all 10 decisions on one screen. You can make changes to your decisions 
as long as you will not have clicked on “OK”. As soon as you will have clicked on “OK”, your 
10 decisions will be definite. 
At the end of the experiment you will be informed about which of your 10 decisions determines 
your pay-off and how much you earn.] 
- - - - - - - - 
Part 2 [3] 
A list of statements will be displayed. Please read each statement carefully and decide if that 
statement describes you or not. If it describes you click the word true if not, choose the word 
false. After each response a new statement will appear. There are sixteen statements. 
1. I sometimes litter. 
2. I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences.  
3. In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others.  
4. I have tried illegal drugs (for example, marijuana, cocaine, etc.).  
5. I always accept others' opinions, even when they don't agree with my own.  
6. I take out my bad moods on others now and then.  
7. There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else.  
8. In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their sentences.  
9. I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency.  
10. When I have made a promise, I keep it--no ifs, ands or buts.  
11. I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back.  
12. I would never live off other people.  
13. I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am stressed out.  
14. During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact.  
15. There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowed.  
16. I always eat a healthy diet.  
17. Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return 
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For each statement, subjects were asked to select True or False. 
- - - - - - - - 
Part 3 [4] 
A list of attitude statements will be displayed. Each represents a commonly held opinion and 
there are no right or wrong answers. Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree. First impressions are usually best in such matters. After each 
response a new statement will appear. There are twenty statements.  
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.  
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
4. Most people are basically good and kind. 
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are 
given a chance. 
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
8. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so. 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. 
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for 
wanting it rather than giving reasons that carry more weight. 
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid 
enough to get caught. 
14. Most men are brave. 
15. It is wise to flatter important people. 
16. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
17. Barnum was very wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every minute. 
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to 
death. 
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20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property. 
For each statement, subjects were asked to select one of the following options: strongly 
disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, no opinion, slightly agree, somewhat agree, 
strongly agree. 
- - - - - - - - 
Part 4 [5] 
In this part of the questionnaire, we would like you to provide some personal information if so 
you wish.  
What is your gender? (Female or Male) 
What is your country of origin? 
Are you a native French speaker? (Yes or No) 
Your age? 
Which course are you registered on? 
Did you attend a course in Economics during your studies? (Yes or No) 
Level of current degree? (License, Master, Doctorat, Other) 
*If you ticked the "Other" in the question above please specify if you wish 
What is your religion or belief? (No Religion, Buddhist, Christian, Sikh, Muslim, Confucian, 
Hindu, Jewish, Atheist, Other or Prefer not to say) 
*If you ticked the "Other" in the question above please specify if you wish 
What is your relationship status? (Single, Engaged, In a relationship, Married, Civil 
Partnership, Widowed, Separated/ Divorced or Prefer not to say) 
How many times have you participated in previous experiments? (0, 1, 2, 3 or More than 3) 
Have you ever participated before in an experiment where the task was to count 1s in a series 
of table containing 0s and 1s like in this experiment?  (Yes or No) 
What do you think this experiment is about?  
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C. Background information on participants 
Experiments 1 and 2 are pooled together. 
Characteristics n = 189 
Gender  
Female 103 (54.50%) 
Male 86 (45.50%) 
Age  
Mean 22.37 
St. dev. 5.12 
Min. 18 
Max. 49 
Level of current degree  
License 94 (49.74%) 
Master 66 (34.92%) 
Doctorat 5 (2.65%) 
Other 24 (12.70%) 
Background in economics1  
No 25 (13.23%) 
Yes 164 (86.77%) 
Country of origin  
Algeria 1 (0.53%) 
Brazil 1 (0.53%) 
Cameroun 1 (0.53%) 
China 1 (0.53%) 
Colombia 1 (0.53%) 
France 164 (86.77%) 
Ivory Coast 2 (1.06%) 
Mali 3 (1.59%) 
Mexico 1 (0.53%) 
Morocco 4 (2.12%) 
Russia 2 (1.06%) 
Senegal 4 (2.12%) 
Tunisia 2 (1.06%) 
Ukraine 1 (0.53%) 
Venezuela 1 (0.53%) 
Native French speaker  
No 20 (10.58%) 
Yes 169 (89.42%) 
Relationship Status  
Concubinage 17 (8.99%) 
In a civil relationship 1 (0.53%) 
Married 5 (2.65%) 
Prefer not to say 7 (3.70%) 
Separated/ Divorced 2 (1.06%) 
Single 157 (83.07%) 
                                                             
1 The question was: “Did you attend a course in Economics during your studies?” Yes or No. 
 18 
 
Religion or belief  
Atheist/Agnostic 104 (55.03%) 
Buddhist 1 (0.53%) 
Christian 58 (30.69%) 
Jew 1 (0.53%) 
Muslim 17 (8.99%) 
Other 2 (1.06%) 
Prefer not to say 6 (3.17%) 
Participation in previous experiments (n.)  
Never 39 (20.63%) 
1 36 (19.05%) 
2 31 (16.4%) 
3 24 (12.7%) 
4 or more 59 (31.22%) 
Participation in a similar real-effort task  
No 184 (97.35%) 
Yes 5 (2.65%) 
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D. Decision problems faced by participants 
Figure D.1 displays a scatter plot with information on the decision problems faced by the 
subjects in Experiments 1 and 2. In the graph, we identify each electoral choice by computing 
the difference in honesty (competence) between the more honest and the less honest candidate. 
The figure distinguishes between situations where there is a trade-off between competence and 
honesty (667 in total in Experiment 1, 741 in Experiment 2), and cases where there is no trade-
off, i.e. one candidate strictly dominates the other in both characteristics (221 in Experiment 1, 
249 in Experiment 2). The greater number of trade-off situations is due to our use of the 
Conditional Information Lottery mechanism, as described in the paper, in order to collect a 
larger proportion of useful data, i.e. with an interesting trade-off between competence and 
honesty of candidates. Overall, Figure D.1 shows a good variation in the decision problems 
faced by the subjects. 
Figure D1: Scatter plot of all the electoral situations faced by the subjects 
 
Notes: In the Y-axis (X-axis), we measure the difference in honesty (competence) between the more honest and 
less honest candidate. The data points are jittered to make each single point visible. 
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E. Analysis of honesty/dishonesty 
In our experiments, honesty is measured as the proportion of the common fund reported to the 
other players. In the experimental literature, it is a standard procedure to measure honesty by 
asking subjects to report a private information (usually a payoff or the outcome of a simple 
task such as rolling a die, tossing a coin or a real-effort task) to the experimenter or another 
player. Differently from previous experiments, we impose a minimum report of 10% to avoid 
a zero effect in the voting phase. 
A purely self-interested agent should always lie to the maximum (in our case, report 10% of 
the common fund). Previous truth-telling experiments have shown that many people are willing 
to truthfully reveal all or part of their private information even when there is no penalty from 
lying. Our results confirm this evidence. In particular, we find that, pooling all the data from 
our two experiments together, 22.75% (28.04% in the second stage) of the participants act as 
strictly income maximizing subjects by reporting the minimum amount. This is in line with the 
proportion of income maximizers estimated, for instance, in die roll experiments. Fischbacher 
and Heusi (2013) estimate, for example, a 22% of income maximizers, while Dai et al. (2017) 
a 28%. The majority of the people who participated in our experiments are partially dishonest 
subjects (68.25% in Stage 1 and 66.67% in Stage 2), while only a tiny fraction are fully honest 
subjects (8.99% in Stage 1 and 5.29% in Stage 2). Figure E1 summarizes all these statistics for 
Stage 1 and Stage 2 respectively by displaying the distribution of the reports. 
As we already mentioned in the paper, there is a very strong correlation between honesty in 
Stage 1 and honesty in Stage 2 (Spearman’s ρ = 0.787, p < 0.001 for all data pooled together) 
suggesting that there is a good consistency in behavior across stages. Most of the subjects, 
however, tend to slightly decrease their honesty in Stage 2 compared to Stage 1 (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p = 0.005), probably due to learning. More specifically, 86 subjects reduce 
their report, 55 subjects report the same percentage, while 48 increase their report. The 
variation in honesty (see Figure E2) is, however, generally small, and mostly between −7% 
(25th percentile) and +1% (75th percentile) with a mean variation of −4.79% (the median is 0%). 
This can be also seen in Figure E3 where we plot the distribution of honesty in Stage 2 for 
different intervals of honesty in Stage 1. In most cases, Stage 2’s honesty lies in the same 
interval of Stage 1’s honesty.  
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Figure E1: Distribution of the amount reported in the public official’s dilemma game 
Panel A: Stage 1 
 
Panel B: Stage 2 
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Figure E2: Variation in honesty between Stage 1 and Stage 2 
 
Figure E3: Distributions of Stage 2’s honesty for different intervals of Stage 1’s honesty 
 
Notes: the dotted lines identify the upper and lower bounds for Stage 2’s honesty to lie in the same interval of 
Stage 1’s honesty. The data points (orange circles) are jittered to make each single point visible. The middle bar 
refers to the median value; the edges of the box correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile; whiskers extend to 1.5 
times the inter-quartile range. 
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F. Alternative analysis with rational expectations 
In this section, we replicate the main analysis reported in the paper using an alternative 
approach to identify rational expectations. We do this separately for each treatment of both 
Experiment 1 and 2. The procedure is the following. 
We first construct a measure of the expected ex-post honesty (competence) by looking 
at how much ex-ante honesty (competence) of the candidates in the real situations explain their 
ex-post honesty (competence). In particular, we can estimate two OLS regressions, one for 
honesty and one for competence, where the dependent variable is the ex-post honesty 
(competence) of the candidates in the real situations, while the independent variable is the ex-
ante honesty (competence) of the candidates in the real situations. We can then multiply the 
estimated coefficients with the ex-ante honesty and the ex-ante competence respectively of all 
the candidates (both real and fictional) to obtain a statistical expected measure of the ex-post 
honesty and ex-post competence respectively. Table F1 presents the result of these estimations. 
Table F1: OLS regressions on ex-post honesty and competence 
 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
No Beliefs Beliefs No Disclosure Extra Edowment 
b se b se b se b se 
Ex-ante Honesty 0.809*** 0.044 0.841*** 0.055 0.806*** 0.052 0.849*** 0.059 
Obs 45  45  54  45  
Adjusted R2 0.882  0.836  0.815  0.820  
Df 1  1  1  1  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 No Beliefs Beliefs No Disclosure Extra Edowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Ex-ante Competence 1.301*** 0.035 1.203*** 0.031 1.255*** 0.028 1.280*** 0.037 
Obs 45  45  54  45  
Adjusted R2 0.968  0.970  0.974  0.963  
Df 1  1  1  1  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: OLS regression. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. Observations are from 
the candidates in the real situations. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The coefficients are not normalized. 
Having now a measure of the expected ex-post honesty and ex-post competence of each 
candidate respectively, we can compute the expected ex-post profit associated to each 
candidate. We can then study whether subjects displayed profit-maximizing rational 
expectations. In particular, we can look at how the probability of voting for the more (ex-post) 
profitable candidate evolves as the difference in ex-post payoffs between the more and less 
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profitable candidates increases (Figure F1).2 If subjects have profit-maximizing rational 
expectations, they should always select the more (ex-post) profitable candidate (graphically, 
we should observe a straight line at P(max(π)) = 1). This seems to be the tendency when the 
difference in ex-post payoffs between the more and less profitable candidates is very large. 
When the difference is smaller, decisions are noisier. The pattern appears to be the same across 
treatments. 
Figure F1: Probability of electing the ex-post more profitable candidate 
 
Notes: P(more ex-post π) is the probability of electing the ex-post more profitable candidate. Δπ is the difference 
in expected payoffs between the more and less ex-post profitable candidate. The running means are weighted to 
give more importance to near points than far, and computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). 
We can now study whether the voters favor the ex-post honest or competent candidate. 
Focusing on cases where there is a trade-off between ex-post honesty and ex-post competence, 
we can look at how the probability of voting for the more ex-post honesty candidate evolves if 
the difference in ex-post payoffs Δπ between the more and less honesty candidates increases 
(Figure F2). For Δπ < 0 (i.e. the ex-post more honesty candidate is also the ex-post less 
profitable), profit-maximizing subjects with rational expectations should vote for the ex-post 
less honesty subjects as he or she is associated with higher ex-post payoffs.  For Δπ > 0 (i.e. 
the ex-post more honest candidate is also the ex-post more profitable), profit-maximizing 
subjects with rational expectations should vote for the ex-post more honest subjects as he or 
she is associated with higher ex-post payoffs. The patterns in Figure F2 are similar to those 
observed for adaptive expectations (see main paper). In particular, the voting behavior is both 
                                                             
2 The probability is obtained by computing the weighted running means of a dichotomous variable taking value 1 
when the ex-post more profitable candidate is elected and 0 otherwise. 
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characterized by a bias towards honesty (i.e. area below the weighted running means for Δπ < 
0) and a bias towards competence (i.e. area above the weighted running means for Δπ > 0). The 
former is however significantly much larger than the latter (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p < 
0.05 for all tests).3 All this means that, in general, subjects did not seem to vote for the ex-post 
more profitable candidate, as rational expectations would predict, but the candidate who is ex-
post more honest. 
Figure F2: Probability of electing the ex-post more  honest candidate 
 
Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more ex-post honest candidate. Δπ is the difference in expected 
payoffs between the more and less ex-post honest candidate. The running means are weighted to give more 
importance to near points than far, and computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). The data corresponds 
to cases where there is a trade-off between ex-post honesty and competence. 
We can also conduct a regression analysis like the one in the paper but using the ex-
post measures of honesty and competence. For each treatment, we present two regressions. In 
a first regression, the independent variables include the Δ log of ex-post honesty and ex-post 
competence of the candidate. In a second regression, we also control for the risk attitude of the 
                                                             
3 The largest difference occur in the No Beliefs treatment of Experiment 1 (43.89% vs. 6.06%), while the smallest 
in the Beliefs treatment of Experiment 1 (37.14% vs. 17.68%). 
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voters, the behavior of the voters in the first stage of the experiment (own competence and 
honesty), and the behavior of the inconsistent subjects (whether a subject is categorized as 
inconsistent).4 Table F2 displays the results of the regressions. 
Table F2: Logit regressions  
Experiment 1 
 No Beliefs No Beliefs Beliefs Beliefs 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 5.54*** 1.57 7.83*** 1.28 5.19*** 1.02 6.18*** 1.06 
Δln(competence) 2.84*** 0.81 4.43*** 0.71 3.21*** 0.58 3.64*** 0.59 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice   0.72 0.89   0.39 0.58 
Δln(competence) × risk choice   0.17 0.42   0.14 0.31 
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty   -2.93** 1.34   -1.35 1.13 
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty   -1.84** 0.77   -1.04* 0.62 
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence   -2.35 2.77   -3.53 2.69 
Δln(competence) × voter's 
competence 
  -1.15 1.25   -1.78 1.59 
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency   -3.74 2.43   -0.88 1.98 
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency   -6.72*** 1.53   0.44 1.03 
Obs 334  334  330  330  
Df 2  9  2  10  
Prob > F 0.001  .  0.000  0.000  
Experiment 2 
 No Disclosure No Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 3.11*** 0.54 4.23*** 0.65 2.08*** 0.57 2.99*** 0.71 
Δln(competence) 1.88*** 0.38 2.46*** 0.38 1.26*** 0.43 1.56*** 0.47 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice   0.22 0.19   0.01 0.33 
Δln(competence) × risk choice   0.22 0.19   0.01 0.27 
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty   -0.82 0.83   0.57 0.69 
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty   -0.47 0.57   -0.33 0.48 
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence   1.66 2.07   1.58** 0.62 
Δln(competence) × voter's 
competence 
  1.97 1.23   1.59*** 0.51 
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency   -2.19*** 0.83   -2.81* 1.70 
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency   -0.01 0.90   -1.22 1.34 
Obs 401  401  334  334  
Df 2  10  2  10  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  
Notes: Logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. The table reports the beta coefficients and the 
standard errors. “Risk choice”, “voter’s honesty” and “voter’s competence” are centered at the mean in order to 
control for high correlation between the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). The data correspond to 
cases where there was a trade-off between ex-post honesty and ex-post competence. Obs = number of 
observations. Df = degrees of freedom. Prob > F = Wald test. Differences in the number of observations reflect 
the fact that we have different number of trade-off cases across treatments. Variables that do not vary over the 
choices of the voters (e.g. indivdual characteristics of the voters), by construction, enter the model only as 
interaction terms. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
In all regressions, both the coefficients of Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) are 
positive and strongly significantly. The coefficient of Δln(honesty) is also significantly larger 
than the coefficient of Δln(competence) (χ2 tests, p < 0.01 for all tests). This indicates that, if 
                                                             
4 As we already explained in the paper, since the characteristics of the voters do not vary over the choices of the 
voters, in the regression we can only have interaction terms between the alternative-specific variables and the 
voter-specific variables. 
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we assume that voters have rational expectations, the bias towards caring about honesty carries 
through. This result supports the key finding of the paper that people care more about the 
honesty of the candidates.  
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G. Analysis without outliers 
In this section, we test whether the results of the paper are driven by those cases where 
the difference in expected profits between the two candidates was very large. We  do so by 
replicating the analysis of the paper with the exclusion of the extreme observations. Outliers 
are detected using the Carling’s (2000) median rule.5 In particular, we drop the observations 
where the difference in expected profits between the the more honest candidate and the more 
competent candidate was larger than 30.89 experimental points and smaller than −36.17 
experimental points (see Figure G1).6 
Figure G1: Histogram of the difference in expected profits (all data together) 
 
Notes: The data correspond to cases where there was a trade-off between competence and honesty. The difference 
in expected profits is between the profit of the more honest candidate and the profit of the more competent 
candidate. Outliers are located on the left and on the right of the first and second vertical line respectively. 
Figure G2 shows the probability of electing the more  honest candidate as a function of 
the difference in expected payoffs between the more and less  honest candidate (as in Figures 
                                                             
5 According to the Median Rule, outliers are the observations above an upper cut-off point 𝑐𝑈 and below an lower 
cut-off point 𝑐𝐿. These points are calculated as: 
𝑐𝑈 = 𝑞2 + 𝑘2(𝑞3 − 𝑞1) 
𝑐𝐿 = 𝑞2 − 𝑘2(𝑞3 − 𝑞1) 
where 𝑞1, 𝑞2, and 𝑞3 are the first, second, and third quartile respectively, while 𝑘2 is a constant based on a pre-
specified outside rate, and it is usually equal to about 2 (Carling, 2000).   
6 Similar cut-off points are obtained if we use the Tuckey’s Rule (Tuckey, 1977). 
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2 and 3 of the paper). Even once we exclude the extreme cases, the green area below the 
weighted running means for Δπ < 0 (honesty bias) is significantly bigger than the area above 
the weighted running means for Δπ > 0 (competence bias) (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p < 
0.05 for all tests). We also replicate the regression analyses of the paper (Table G1). With the 
removal of the outliers, the results do not change. In particular, the coefficient of log(honesty) 
is significantly larger than the coefficient of log(competence) in all the regressions (χ2 tests, p 
< 0.01).   
Figure G2: Probability of electing the more  honest candidate 
 
 Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more honest candidate. Δπ is the difference in expected payoffs 
between the more and less  honest candidate. The running means are weighted to give more importance to near 
points than far, and computed using a bandwith of 0.6 (60% of the data). 
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Table G1: Logit regressions  
Experiment 1 
 No Beliefs No Beliefs Beliefs Beliefs 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 5.59*** 1.61 7.69*** 1.28 5.16*** 1.05 6.04*** 1.05 
Δln(competence) 2.88*** 0.80 4.34*** 0.71 3.20*** 0.60 3.57*** 0.59 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice   0.76 0.87   0.4 0.6 
Δln(competence) × risk choice   0.2 0.42   0.14 0.32 
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty   -3.00** 1.32   -1.51 1.14 
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty   -1.89** 0.77   -1.15* 0.63 
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence   -2.47 2.75   -3.19 2.46 
Δln(competence) × voter's competence   -1.25 1.28   -1.56 1.44 
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency   -2.94 2.37   -0.86 2.05 
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency   -6.19*** 1.41   0.44 1.1 
Obs 326  326  325  325  
Df 2  9  2  10  
Prob > F 0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Experiment 2 
 No Disclosure No Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
Extra Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 3.02*** 0.58 4.00*** 0.68 2.74*** 0.55 3.61*** 0.81 
Δln(competence) 1.81*** 0.43 2.27*** 0.43 1.78*** 0.42 2.02*** 0.48 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice   0.35 0.24   -0.16 0.33 
Δln(competence) × risk choice   0.31 0.24   -0.08 0.27 
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty   -1.05 0.77   0.47 0.81 
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty   -0.74 0.55   -0.46 0.52 
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence   2.03 2.52   1.78*** 0.64 
Δln(competence) × voter's competence   2.42 1.7   1.79*** 0.56 
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency   -1.57 1.1   -2.75 1.99 
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency   0.6 1.11   -0.81 1.53 
Obs 381  381  326  326  
Df 2  10  2  10  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. The table reports the beta coefficients and the 
standard errors. “Risk choice”, “voter’s honesty” and “voter’s competence” are centered at the mean in order to 
control for high correlation between the independent variables (see Marquardt, 1980). The data correspond to 
cases where there was a trade-off between honesty and competence. Obs = number of observations. Df = degrees 
of freedom. Prob > F = Wald test. Differences in the number of observations reflect the fact that we have different 
number of trade-off cases across treatments. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
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H. Regression on real situations 
In this section, we report the same regression analysis of the paper but only including the “real” 
candidates, i.e. those who were in the real situations. Note that this drastically reduces the 
number of observations and the precision of our tests (recall that we focus only on trade-off 
cases). To minimize the loss of power, we pool all treatments from Experiment 1 and 2 
together. Regressions 1 and 2 are based on measured competence and honesty, while 
Regressions 3 and 4 are based on the voters’ beliefs about competence and honesty. The results 
are qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper. In Regressions 1 and 3, both the 
coefficients of the Δln of honesty (𝛼𝐻) and the Δln of competence (𝛼𝐻) are positive and 
significant. The former is also significantly larger than the latter (χ2 test, p < 0.05 for both 
regressions), suggesting that subjects tend to weigh honesty more than competence. Once we 
control for other covariates (see Regressions 2 and 4), the coefficient of the ln of competence 
loses its significance (at 10% and 5% level respectively).7 The results are also consistent if we 
assume rational expectations. In particular, the ratio of the estimated coefficients 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  
from each regression based on adaptive expectations is significantly larger than the ratio of the 
rational-expectations weights of past honesty and competence (𝛼𝐻
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐶
𝑅) (χ2 test, p < 0.01). 
Table H1: Logit regressions  
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 1.64*** 0.38 1.99*** 0.58 2.48*** 0.76 9.86** 4.65 
Δln(competence) 1.04** 0.41 0.83 0.87 1.46* 0.81 8.49* 5.02 
Δln(honesty) × risk choice   -0.21 0.26   -2.80* 1.45 
Δln(competence) × risk choice   -1.06** 0.48   -3.86** 1.85 
Δln(honesty) × voter's honesty   0.22 0.54   -3.15 2.22 
Δln(competence) × voter's honesty   0.21 0.84   -2.64 2.5 
Δln(honesty) × voter's competence   1.58* 0.88   -4.59 5.87 
Δln(competence) × voter's competence   2.71* 1.61   -2.18 5.85 
Δln(honesty) × Inconsistency   -0.47 1   -4.75 3.33 
Δln(competence) × Inconsistency   2.69 2.6   -3.19 4.91 
Obs 85  85  47  47  
Df 2  10  2  10  
Prob > F 0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Logit regression. The table reports the beta coefficients and the standard errors. Regressions 1 and 2 are 
based on adaptive expectations. Regressions 3 and 4 are based on stated beliefs (only available in the Beliefs 
treatment of Experiment 1, and all treatments of Experiment 2). Tests under the assumption of rational 
expectations can be derived and are analyzed in the main appendix text. “Risk choice”, “voter’s honesty” and 
“voter’s competence” are centered at the mean in order to control for high correlation between the independent 
variables (see Marquardt, 1980). The data correspond to cases in the real situations where there was a trade-off 
                                                             
7 In Regression 2, 𝛼𝐻 is significantly greater than 𝛼𝐶  (χ
2 test, p = 0.036). In Regression 4, the test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that 𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 (p = 0.358). This is most likely due to a lack of power since we have fewer 
observations and many non-significant independent variables which drastically reduce the precision of our test. 
Indeed, if we only retain the significant variables, the coefficient of Δln(honesty) remains significant (at 5% level), 
while the coefficient of Δln(competence) becomes not significant (p > 0.1). 
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between honesty and competence. Obs = number of observations. Df = degrees of freedom. Prob > F = Wald test. 
Differences in the number of observations reflect the fact that we have different number of trade-off cases across 
treatments. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
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I. Monte Carlo simulation for different noise levels 
In this section, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation on 1,000 simulated expected-value 
maximizing voters encountering the same sets of candidates faced by our participants in the 
experiment. We assume that these voters make random mistakes. In particular, they choose 
based on the utility difference between the candidates plus a random noise which is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎2. We vary σ to be equal to 20% (small noise), 50% 
(medium noise), 80% (large noise), 120% (very large noise) and 200% (huge noise) of the 
standard deviation of the utility difference. With no noise, the voting behavior follows the 
profit-maximizing pattern depicted by the dotted red line in Figures 1 and 2 of the main paper, 
and Figure I1. The simulated noisy patterns of voting behavior are reported in Figure I1, 
separately for each treatment. 
 Figure I1: Simulated patterns of profit-maximing voting behavior for different noise levels 
 
    
The figure shows that adding a noise to the behavior of profit-maximizing voters produces 
either an equal bias towards honesty and competence (Experiment 1) or a greater bias toward 
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competence (Experiment 2), and, therefore, could not explain the larger bias towards honesty 
that we observe in our data. 
To confirm that there is nothing specific about the choice sets faced by our participants which 
would generate choices that appear honesty-biased, we estimate the same regressions reported 
in the paper using the simulated sample of expected value maximizers for different levels of 
noise.8 Table I1 reports, for each level of noise and separately for each treatment, the average 
coefficients of Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) for the 1,000 estimates, the average p-value 
obtained from testing whether the two coefficients are different or not, the rejection rate of the 
test against the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are not different (this is computed for 
a rejection size of 10% and 5% respectively), and the percentage of cases (out of 1,000) where 
the coefficient for Δln(honesty) is significantly larger (at 10% and 5% level respectively) than 
the coefficient for Δln(competence).  
Table I1: Simulated patterns of profit-maximing voting behavior for different noise levels 
Variable Treatment 
Level of noise 
20% 50% 80% 120% 200% 
Avg. coefficient of  
Δln(honesty) 
No Beliefs 12.48 4.72 2.88 1.90 1.13 
Beliefs 12.37 4.69 2.87 1.90 1.12 
No Disclosure 12.47 4.72 2.87 1.88 1.11 
Extra Endowment 12.44 4.72 2.90 1.90 1.14 
Avg. coefficient of 
Δln(competence) 
No Beliefs 12.47 4.69 2.86 1.89 1.12 
Beliefs 12.37 4.69 2.87 1.89 1.13 
No Disclosure 12.45 4.72 2.86 1.87 1.10 
Extra Endowment 12.44 4.70 2.88 1.89 1.12 
p-value (Honesty=Competence) 
No Beliefs 0.495 0.517 0.515 0.517 0.513 
Beliefs 0.509 0.505 0.505 0.501 0.491 
No Disclosure 0.485 0.514 0.492 0.504 0.494 
Extra Endowment 0.488 0.497 0.505 0.508 0.498 
Rejection rate 
for size = 10% 
No Beliefs 10.10% 8.30% 7.90% 10.30% 9.30% 
Beliefs 9.00% 9.60% 10.30% 8.60% 9.30% 
No Disclosure 10.70% 8.90% 9.60% 11.30% 10.00% 
Extra Endowment 11.00% 10.00% 10.00% 9.10% 9.00% 
Rejection rate 
for size = 5% 
No Beliefs 4.40% 3.80% 3.40% 4.40% 4.60% 
Beliefs 3.90% 4.00% 4.40% 4.30% 4.10% 
No Disclosure 5.00% 3.80% 5.10% 5.20% 4.50% 
Extra Endowment 5.50% 4.90% 4.50% 4.20% 3.90% 
% of cases 
Δln(Honesty) > Δln(Competence) 
(at 10% level) 
No Beliefs 5.90% 4.40% 3.50% 4.70% 4.50% 
Beliefs 4.40% 3.80% 4.40% 3.60% 3.80% 
No Disclosure 6.10% 4.70% 5.10% 6.10% 5.30% 
Extra Endowment 6.30% 6.00% 5.70% 5.20% 4.80% 
% of cases 
Δln(Honesty) > Δln(Competence) 
(at 5% level) 
No Beliefs 2.10% 1.50% 1.20% 1.60% 2.30% 
Beliefs 1.80% 1.60% 1.60% 1.80% 1.50% 
No Disclosure 3.00% 2.00% 3.00% 2.90% 2.90% 
Extra Endowment 3.50% 2.80% 2.80% 2.70% 1.80% 
                                                             
8 To improve the readability of this section (and especially Table I1), we only report the results of the regressions 
with Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) as independent variables. The results of the regressions with the other 
controls are qualitatively the same and are available from the authors upon request. 
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The table shows that the coefficients of Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) are almost 
indistinguishable for each treatment and given level of noise. The average p-values are way 
above the 10% level. In all cases, the average rejection rate is below or very close (≤ 1.30%) 
to the size of the test (10% or 5%), suggesting that the two coefficients are not statistically 
different. In addition, we find that the coefficient of Δln(honesty) is significantly larger than 
the coefficient of Δln(competence) in only a tiny fraction of replications. We can thus conclude 
that a noisy voting behavior of profit-maximizing voters is very unlikely to generate choices 
that appear honesty-biased. If anything, we should observe the opposite, making our results of 
an honesty bias even more striking. 
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J. Is the honesty bias driven by the unwillingness of the subjects to vote for 
candidates who were less competent or honest than them? 
Figure J1: Probability of electing the more honest candidate for different profiles of 
candidates who are more or less competent or honest than the voter 
 
Panel A: Experiment 1 
 
Panel B: Experiment 2 
 
Notes: P(T) is the probability of electing the more honest candidate. Δπ is the difference in expected payoffs 
between the more and less honest candidate. The running means are weighted to give more importance to near 
points than far, and computed using a bandwidth of 0.6 (60% of the data). The data correspond to cases where 
there is a trade-off between honesty and competence. Treatments within each experiment are pooled together to 
save space. ‘None/One/Both competent (honest)’ means that none of /one of/both candidates was/were less 
competent (honest) than the voter. 
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To study whether the honesty bias is driven by the unwillingness of the subjects to vote for 
candidates who were less competent or honest than them, we divide all trade-off cases into 
different groups depending on whether (i) none of the two candidates were less competent 
(honest) than the voter; (ii) one of the two candidates was less competent (honest) than the 
voter; and (iii) both candidates were less competent (honest) than the voter. If the observed 
honesty bias is explained by a propensity of the subjects to vote for candidates who are less 
competent or honest than them, we should observe an honesty bias only when one of the two 
candidates is less competent (honest) than the voter, and certainly not when neither is. 
However, as the Figure J1 above shows, the honesty bias characterizes all the aforementioned 
groups. This is also confirmed if we run separate regressions for each group (available upon 
request). 
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K. Regression analysis assuming a different specification for the utility of the voters  
In this section, we test whether our results are robust to an alternative specification of the utility 
function of the voters. In particular, we consider a utility function which linearly depends on 
the expected value of a candidate, plus two additive terms for honesty and competence.9 The 
utility that voter n gets if candidate j is appointed can be written as: 
𝑈𝑛,𝑗 = 𝛼𝜋𝜋𝑛,𝑗 + 𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑗 + 𝛼𝐶 𝐶𝑛𝑗 + 𝜖𝑛,𝑗 
where 𝜋𝑛,𝑗 is the expected value of candidate j for voter n (i.e. the earnings that voter n expects 
to obtain if candidate j is appointed), while 𝐻𝑛𝑗 (𝐶𝑛𝑗) captures the mean expectation of voter n 
on the honesty (competence) of candidate j. If voters only care about the expected value of a 
candidate, we should have 𝛼𝜋 > 0, and 𝛼𝐻 = 𝛼𝐶 = 0. However, if they also have an intrinsic 
preference towards honesty or competence per se, we should observe 𝛼𝐻 > 0 or 𝛼𝐶 > 0. 
Finally, if they care more about honesty than competence (as we found for the specification 
reported in the main paper), the coefficient for honesty should be larger than the coefficient for 
competence (𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐶). We can test empirically all this by regressing the probability of 
choosing candidate i over j on the utility differences as we did in the main paper. We run 
separate regressions for each treatment as in the main paper. The results are reported in Table 
K1. In the table, we also indicate whether we control or not for other covariates (the same used 
in the regressions of the main paper).10 In all regressions, 𝛼𝜋 is significantly greater than zero, 
suggesting that subjects did care about the expected value of a candidate. We also find that 𝛼𝐻 
is significantly bigger than zero while 𝛼𝐶  is not, and that 𝛼𝐻 is significantly larger than 𝛼𝐶  (p 
< 0.05 for all regressions). These results confirm those reported in the paper, if anything with 
stronger evidence in favor of the honesty bias and no evidence of a competence bias.  
We can also test whether these results hold if we assume rational expectations. Note 
that, given the different specification of the utility function, we cannot compare the ratio of the 
utility coefficients estimated in the regression analysis described above with the ‘rational-
expectations’ coefficients calculated in the main paper. What we can do is to construct a 
measure of the level of profitability, honesty, and competence respectively that a voter with 
rational expectations should expect from each candidate based on stage 1’s information. To 
obtain these measures, we can run some linear regressions where the dependent variable is the 
                                                             
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this specification. 
10 The full regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
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stage 2’s profitability, honesty and competence respectively of each subject, while the 
independent variable is her stage 1’s profitability, honesty and competence (Table F1 reports 
the results for honesty and competence). We can then multiply the estimated coefficients with 
stage 1’s profitability, honesty and competence of each candidate to obtain a statistical 
expected measure of what a voter with rational expectations should expect from each candidate 
in terms of profitability, honesty and competence. We can then conduct a regression analysis 
based on these measures. The results of this analysis are reported at the bottom of Table K1, 
and are consistent with those for adaptive expectations and stated beliefs. 
Table K1: Logit regressions 
Regressions based on adaptive expectations 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 
No Beliefs Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δπ 0.10*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 
ΔHonesty 6.04*** 1.44 4.21*** 1.42 3.04** 1.3 2.34* 1.29 
ΔCompetence 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Obs 334  333  402  339  
Df 3  3  3  3  
Prob > F 0  0  0  0.001  
 
No Beliefs Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δπ 0.11*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 
ΔHonesty 6.66*** 1.54 5.50*** 1.6 4.60*** 1.7 3.17** 1.38 
ΔCompetence 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs 334  333  402  339  
Df 11  11  11  11  
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  
Continued on the next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Regressions based on stated beliefs 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 
No Beliefs Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b  
Δπ - - 0.11*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.04* se 
ΔHonesty - - 5.17*** 1.56 2.86** 1.42 3.81*** 0.02 
ΔCompetence - - 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 1.41 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
-  No 
 
No 
 
No 0.01 
Obs -  263  321  260  
Df -  3  3  3  
Prob > F -  0  0  0  
 b se b se b se b se 
Δπ - - 0.11*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.04 0.03 
ΔHonesty - - 7.27*** 2.02 4.09** 1.87 4.27*** 1.59 
ΔCompetence - - 0.01 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
-  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs -  263  321  260  
Df -  11  11  11  
Prob > F -  0  0  0  
Regressions based on rational expectations 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 
No Beliefs Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b  
Δπ 0.09*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 
ΔHonesty 7.47*** 1.78 5.00*** 1.68 3.77** 1.61 2.75* 1.52 
ΔCompetence 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.01 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
No  No  No  No  
Obs 334  333  402  339  
Df 3  3  3  3  
Prob > F 0  0  0  0.001  
 b se b se b se b se 
Δπ 0.11*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 
ΔHonesty 8.24*** 1.91 6.54*** 1.9 5.71*** 2.11 3.74** 1.62 
ΔCompetence 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 334  333  402  339  
Df 11  11  11  11  
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  
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Notes: Logit regression with clustered robust standard errors. The table reports the beta coefficients and the 
standard errors. The data correspond to cases where there is a trade-off between honesty and competence. Obs = 
number of observations. Df = degrees of freedom. Prob > F = Wald test. Differences in the number of observations 
reflect the fact that we have different number of trade-off cases across treatments. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01.  
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L. Regression analysis with standardized independent variables 
Table L1 reports the results of the same regression analysis reported in the main paper 
but with the variables Δln(honesty) and Δln(competence) standardized (i.e. we rescaled the 
variables to have each a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one by subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the standard deviation). The results replicate those in the paper. In particular, 
in all regressions, both the coefficients of Δ log of honesty (𝛼𝐻) and Δ log of competence (𝛼𝐶) 
are positive and significant. The coefficient of Δln(honesty) is also significantly larger the 
coefficient of Δln(competence) (χ2 test, p < 0.01 for all regressions). We can also study whether 
the results are consistent if we assume rational expectations. In particular, we can test whether 
the ratio of the estimated coefficients 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  from each regression based on adaptive 
expectations is significantly larger than the ratio of the rational expectations weights of past 
honesty and competence (𝛼𝐻
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐶
𝑅) . This is true for all regressions (χ2 test, p < 0.01). 
Table L1: Logit regressions 
Regressions based on adaptive expectations 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
 
No Beliefs Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 3.75*** 1.09 3.64*** 0.71 2.09*** 0.38 1.43*** 0.4 
Δln(competence) 1.73*** 0.5 2.06*** 0.37 1.15*** 0.24 0.81*** 0.28 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
No  No  No  No  
Obs 334  333  402  339  
Df 2  2  2  2  
Prob > F 0.002  0  0  0.002  
 
No Beliefs Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 5.29*** 0.88 4.27*** 0.71 2.83*** 0.46 2.07*** 0.5 
Δln(competence) 2.70*** 0.44 2.29*** 0.36 1.48*** 0.25 1.01*** 0.31 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs 334  333  402  339  
Df 10  10  10  10  
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  
Continued on the next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Regressions based on stated beliefs 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
 
No 
Beliefs 
Beliefs 
No 
Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b  
ΔHonesty - - 4.26*** 0.7 2.17*** 0.33 1.68*** 0.34 
ΔCompetence - - 2.04*** 0.39 0.98*** 0.22 0.93*** 0.26 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
-  No  No  No  
Obs -  263  321  260  
Df -  2  2  2  
Prob > F -  0  0  0  
 b se b se b se b se 
ΔHonesty - - 5.22*** 0.73 2.97*** 0.5 2.61*** 0.62 
ΔCompetence - - 2.38*** 0.4 1.46*** 0.27 1.30*** 0.37 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
-  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs -  263  321  260  
Df -  10  10  10  
Prob > F -  0  0  0  
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M. Regression analysis without subjects who were affected by a programming error 
Due to a technical problem during the voting stage of one session in the Beliefs 
treatment, the information about honesty and competence of some candidates were displayed 
as 0s in the computer screen of certain voters. In the analysis reported in the main paper, we 
dropped the 12 voting choices which were affected by this problem. Here, we replicate the 
analysis but excluding completely the participants who were affected by this programming 
error. Table M1 reports the results of the regression analysis. The results are in line with those 
reported in the paper. In all regressions, the coefficients of Δ log of honesty (𝛼𝐻) and Δ log of 
competence (𝛼𝐶) are positive and significant. The coefficient of Δln(honesty) is significantly 
larger the coefficient of Δln(competence) (χ2 test, p < 0.05 for all regressions). If we assume 
rational expectations and we compare the ratio of the estimated coefficients 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝐶  based 
on adaptive expectations with the ratio of the rational-expectations weights of past honesty and 
competence (𝛼𝐻
𝑅  and 𝛼𝐶
𝑅), we find that the former is significantly larger than the latter (χ2 test, 
p < 0.01 for all regressions). All this is consistent with the results reported in the main paper. 
Table M1: Logit regressions 
Regressions based on adaptive expectations 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
 
No Beliefs Beliefs No Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 5.47*** 1.59 6.03*** 1.43 3.02*** 0.55 2.08*** 0.58 
Δln(competence) 2.81*** 0.82 3.94*** 0.82 1.84*** 0.38 1.30*** 0.44 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Obs 334  249  402  339  
Df 2  2  2  2  
Prob > F 0.002  0  0  0.002  
 
No Beliefs Beliefs No Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b se 
Δln(honesty) 7.77*** 1.28 6.82*** 1.39 4.11*** 0.67 2.99*** 0.73 
Δln(competence) 4.40*** 0.71 4.40*** 0.82 2.39*** 0.4 1.61*** 0.5 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs 334  249  402  339  
Df 10  10  10  10  
Prob > F 0  0  0  0  
Continued on the next page 
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Regressions based on stated beliefs 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
 
No 
Beliefs 
Beliefs No Disclosure 
Extra 
Endowment 
 b se b se b se b  
ΔHonesty - - 6.35*** 1.35 3.01*** 0.47 2.32*** 0.47 
ΔCompetence - - 4.08*** 0.94 1.72*** 0.39 1.63*** 0.46 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
-  No  No  No  
Obs -  192  321  260  
Df -  2  2  2  
Prob > F -  0  0  0  
 b se b se b se b se 
ΔHonesty - - 8.00*** 1.49 4.16*** 0.7 3.61*** 0.86 
ΔCompetence - - 5.11*** 0.93 2.58*** 0.48 2.25*** 0.64 
Interactions with behavioral and 
psychological variables 
-  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs -  192  321  260  
Df -  10  10  10  
Prob > F -  0  0  0  
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N. Analysis of the social preference elicitation task (based on Kerschbamer, 2015) 
In both treatments of Experiment 2 (except in one session of the No Disclosure treatment), we 
include, at the end of the experiment, a social preference elicitation task based on Kerschbamer 
(2015). In this task, each subject makes 10 different binary allocation choices between 
himself/herself and another subject (see Table N1).  One decision is randomly chosen for the 
payment.  
Based on the decisions made in the 10 different allocation choices, subjects can be classified 
in five main categories: altruistic, inequality averse, equality averse, spiteful, and selfish.11 
Figure N1 presents the results of this classification (see Kerschbamer (2015) for more details 
on how to classify subjects). The behavior of most of the subjects is consistent with some (weak 
or strong) kind of altruistic preferences (66.67%). Selfish preferences describe the behavior of 
almost half of the subject pool (45.56%). Only 12.22% of the subjects display a behavior 
consistent with (any form of) inequality aversion. Spiteful types and equality-averse types are 
less common (8.89% and 7.78% respectively). These figures do not differ much from those 
reported in Kerschbamer (2015) (see Table N2; χ2 test, p = 0.251). 
Table N1: The ten decisions in the social preference elicitation task 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block 
LEFT 
Your Choice 
(Please mark) 
RIGHT 
You get 
Passive agent 
gets 
 You get 
Passive agent 
gets 
4 Points 6.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT  5 Points 5 Points 
4.5 Points 6.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
5 Points 6.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
5.5 Points 6.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
6 Points 6.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
Advantageous Inequality Block 
LEFT 
Your Choice 
(Please mark) 
RIGHT 
You get 
Passive agent 
gets 
 You get 
Passive agent 
gets 
4 Points 3.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT  5 Points 5 Points 
4.5 Points 3.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
5 Points 3.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
5.5 Points 3.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
6 Points 3.5 Points LEFT       RIGHT 5 Points 5 Points 
Note: in the Extra Endowment treatment, we re-scaled the payoffs by a factor of 4 to keep the incentives as in the 
No Disclosure treatment (recall that, in the Extra Endowment treatment, we reduced the point-to-Euro exchange 
rate from 0.2 to 0.05). 
                                                             
11 The classification assigns selfish subjects to one of the other four categories as weak incarnations of those types.   
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Figure N1: Distributional types in (x, y) space 
 
Notes: The data points are jittered; 4 subjects did not pass the consistency check and are not include in the figure. 
Table N2: Comparison with Kerschbamer (2015)’s classification 
Type Galeotti and Zizzo (2016) Kerschbamer (2015) 
Inequality averse 11 (12.22%) 22 (22.92%) 
Altruistic 60 (66.67%) 61 (63.54%) 
Spiteful 8 (8.89%) 6 (6.25%) 
Equality averse 7 (7.78%) 3 (3.13%) 
Inconsistent 4 (4.44%) 4 (4.17%) 
Selfish 41 (45.56%) 45 (46.88%) 
Non-selfish 49 (54.44%) 51 (53.12%) 
Total 90 (100%) 96 (100%) 
Note: In the two classifications (ours and Kerschbamer (2015)’s one), we also include subjects who did not pass 
the consistency check (inconsistent types). 
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O. The Relationship between Voters’ Altruism and Preferences towards Competence 
and Honesty 
This appendix explains how our findings are robust to altruistic preferences on the part of the 
voters. In our design, honesty defines whether the public official gets or not a larger share of 
the pie, while competence determines the size of the pie.  
We can prove that, the more subjects are altruistic and indifferent between increasing the 
welfare of any other voter or the one of the public official,12 they should care less about honesty 
and more about competence, making our results of an honesty bias even more remarkable. 
Assume that subjects have a standard utility function with altruism, where subjects care about 
their own payoff and that of the other two players weighted by a common altruism parameter 
β. It is usual in a model with altruism to assume β to range between 0 (no altruism) and 1 
(utilitarianism: care about everyone the same oneself included); altruism is increasing in β. 
We frame our proof in terms of a linear function for simplicity of exposition, but it would be 
straightforward to have a log-linear function as in the main paper. The own expected payoff (if 
one is not the public official) is (4/3) H*C (where H is the proportion of the common fund that 
the voter expects the public official to return and C is the expected number of tables correctly 
solved on top of 40); the payoff of the public official instead is 4C – (8/3) H*C. The voter’s 
utility function is then: 
 
𝑈 =  
4
3
𝐻𝐶 + 𝛽 (4𝐶 −
8
3
𝐻𝐶 +
4
3
𝐻𝐶) =
4
3
𝐻𝐶 + 𝛽 (4𝐶 −
4
3
𝐻𝐶) 
Note that, in the lack of altruism (= 0), we are back to giving the same weight to honesty and 
competence. We can identify whether the utility function places greater weight on competence 
or honesty as altruism increases: 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐻
= (1 − 𝛽)
4
3
𝐶 
                                                             
12 The plausible exception to the indifference assumption would be one where altruistic preferences are convex, 
i.e. there is diminishing marginal utility from each player’s payoff. This would then mean that subjects should 
wish to benefit more a ‘poor’ subject than a ‘rich’ subject. The same qualitative predictions would then follow as 
for an inequality averse model, which we test with the Extra Endowment treatment. 
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𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶
= 4𝛽 + (1 − 𝛽)
4
3
𝐻 
From the above first derivatives, it is clear that the weight on honesty goes down as β increases, 
vanishing to 0 as β tends to 1; while the weight on competence goes up as β increases.  
Intuitively, think of a utilitarian subject with β = 1: since he or she cares about everyone’s 
payoff equally, it will not be relevant how the payoff is split up across different people (which 
is what honesty determines) but simply the size of the overall pie (which is what competence 
determines). 
What is clear from our experiment is that, given the Extra Endowment treatment, it looks like 
whatever determinant of a preference of honesty of others we have, it would have to be based 
on preferences for honest acts as opposed to preference for honest people (where voting for the 
honest candidate means to harm her or him). Within this context, a preference for altruistic 
behavior may be at least part of what a preference for honest behavior is about – as we mention 
earlier, we do not decompose different components of honesty.  
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